POLITICS OF AMNESTY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN NIGERIA’S NIGER DELTA

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Abstract
This work examines the Government’s Amnesty Programme and other strategies adopted in the Niger Delta since 1958 as a conflict management mechanism to tackle the conflict in the region and how to sustain the amnesty-induced peace. The causes of failure of previous strategies were highlighted as lesson for implementers of the peace building programmes. No one knows to which extent the Government is sincere in addressing issues of security and socio-economic reconstruction in the region. Findings revealed that there is no legal framework on which the current amnesty and peace building programme is hinged instead the mode of implementation has been tied to key political and militant leaders with no clearly established institutions on which it is embedded. The study recommended that stakeholders should collaborate to tackle the question of massive socio-economic reconstruction, and confront the challenge of environmental despoliation, poverty and unemployment head on with a ‘Marshall-type’ intervention.

Keywords: Conflict, Amnesty, Management, Peace building, Niger Delta,

Introduction
Since 2009 amnesty and peace building programmes has been implemented for an estimated 30,000 former militants from the Niger Delta, with the view to achieving enduring peace in that oil rich but conflict ridden enclave of Nigeria. The basic components of the programmes include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). This conflict management strategy, though laudable, issues of socio-economic reconstruction still remain grossly unaddressed and cast shadows of doubt about government’s sincerity to drive the peace process through. The discovery of oil in 1956 by Anglo-Dutch group, Shell D’Arshy in commercial quantity at Oloibiri, Bayelsa State and the coming of other multinationals including Mobil, Elf Aquitaine, Chevron, Agip and Texaco changed the region’s political economy (Ekpo, 2004). With over 600 oil fields and more than 400 oil production and storage facilities criss-crossing the region’s landmass; the average production of crude oil stands at 2.4 million barrel per day (Ibaba, 2011). The income from crude oil and gas and other associated products accounts for about 80% of government’s revenue and 90% of foreign earnings. Thus, the nation has come to depend mainly on the oil and gas sector for survival (Kuku, 2012, Ikelegbe, 2005; Imobighe, 2004). Increased activities by the multinational oil companies brought in its trail economic dislocation, intra and inter ethnic migration and conflict, moral decadence especially among youths, female depravity, male crime and revolution of induced needs (Sanda, 2005). The oil resources instead
of a blessing have negatively affected the rich diversity of flora and fauna making the land and water unproductive and a ‘curse’ (Eyinla & Ukpo, 2006). This situation created, has enormous damage to agricultural crops, destruction of fishing farms, and the pollution of potable water. The damage cannot be quantified, and to address these peculiarities, especially those stresses of environmental cum demographic insecurity, the people embarked on a long and sustained struggle to control the resources derived from the region (Adekanye, 2007).

**Grievances Revisited**

Ikelegbe (2010); Ukiwo (2010); Ako and Okonmah (2009); Isumonah (2005) and a host of other scholars have dealt extensively on the background causes of the conflict. They identified several grievances including the poor state of development; abject poverty in the midst of plenty; absence of basic social amenities; corporate irresponsibility associated with oil companies operations; violence and systematic institution of terror by successive regimes and repressive measures taken against leading spokesperson; flagrant human rights violations; absence of fiscal federalism; denial of access to the benefit from oil derived wealth; environmental degradation and poor welfare programmes; hegemonic politics; divide and rule policies; unemployment; rigging of elections; chieftaincy tussle and corruption as some of the background reasons for the protracted conflicts. The matter was worsened by obnoxious legislations that alienated the people from land ownership and control of resources. Such legislations include, the Petroleum Control Degrees of 1967; the Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1968; Mineral Oil (Safety) Regulations Law No 45 of 1968; Petroleum Act of 1968; Oil Terminal Dues of 1969; Land Use Act of 1978; Exclusive Economic Zone Act of 1978; Land Title Vesting Decree of 1993 and the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree of 1997 and many others which had vested the entire ownership and control of all population in, under or upon any lands on the Nigerian state (Obi, 2010; Nna-Ntete, 2001).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Niger Delta Human Development Report issued in 2006 portrays the often cited contradiction of huge oil wealth derivable from the region and the state of development thus:

> Its rich endowments of oil and gas resources feed methodically into the international economic system, in exchange for massive revenues that carry the promise of rapid socio-economic transformation within the delta itself. In reality, the Niger Delta is a region suffering from administrative neglect, crumbling social infrastructure and services, high unemployment, social deprivation, abject poverty, filth and squalor, and endemic conflict (UNDP, 2006:9).

Given unmet goals and the situation pictured above, frustrated youths mobilized resistance movements to disrupt oil production, with the intension to ground the economy to zero level. Protests were so intense, between 1998 and 2009 that the region became a safe haven for insurgents. Between 2006 and 2009 there were over 110 attacks targeted at the oil industry alone. The struggle was consequently hijacked by multiple gangs of militants, cult groups and criminals bands who engaged in underground economy to fund their struggles against the federal government and multinational oil companies. These rampaging militia groups dotted everywhere in the region with impunity posed serious security and economic challenge to the Nigerian state in particular (Ogbogbo, 2011; Osaghae, 2011; Ojakorotu & Whetho, 2008).
Conflict Management Strategies for the Niger Delta
Before introduction of the Amnesty Programme in 2009, a number of initiatives had been embarked upon by the successive Governments of Nigeria aimed at resolution of the conflict. These include the Establishment of Commissions, Interventionist Agencies and the granting of amnesty as conflict management strategies for the Niger Delta.

Establishment of Commissions of Inquiry
The Nigerian Government had set up several commissions of inquiry to look into the peculiar circumstances of the Niger Delta, especially those bordering on under-development and problems of insurgency. Admittedly, before the discovery of oil, the concern of the people of the region, like those of other minority ethnic nationalities of the federation, had centered on fear of domination and marginalization by the majority ethnic groups whose members controlled the Government and access of state power in the region and the federation.

Beginning from 1958 when Sir Henry Willink’s Commission was appointed to Enquire into the Fears of the Minorities in Nigeria just before independence, the government has not ceased to institute commissions and committees to finding a way forward in tackling the Niger Delta question. Some of the commissions include: The Justice Alfa Belgore Judicial Commission of Inquiry of 1992; The Ministerial Fact-Finding Team (the Don Etiebet Committee) of 1994; Major General Popoola Committee of 1998; Lt. General Alexander Ogomudia Committee on the Special Security Committee on Oil Producing Area of 2001; The 2003 Presidential Panel on National Security otherwise referred as the Presidential Committee on Peace and Reconciliation; The Niger Delta Regional Master Plan of 2004; The Presidential Council on the Social and Economic Development of the Costal States of the Niger Delta 2006; The Technical Committee on the Niger Delta 2008 and many more (Kuku, 2012; Idemudia & Ite, 2006).

In addition to these federally mandated regional development institutions, the States of the Niger Delta came up with state-level development and peace initiatives. Prominent of these were the Ondo State Oil Producing Area Development Commission (OSOPADEC), the Rivers State Sustainable Development Program (RSSDP), the Bayelsa Partnership Initiative (BPI), and the Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission (DESOPADEC) (Francis, LaPin & Rossiaco, 2011).

Interventionist Agencies
As if almost in response to those recommendations made in the past by various commissions on the Niger Delta, the Federal Government had established a host of interventionist agencies in a way to address the issues at the root of the conflict. These agencies were mostly aimed at providing basic infrastructural amenities, social services and economic empowerment programmes (Aaron & George, 2010) and include the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) of 1961; Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA) of 1976; Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) of 1992; Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) of 2000 and the Ministry of the Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) of 2008 (Agbede, 2010; Ekpo, 2004).

Laudable as all those initiatives appeared to be, they failed to yield the expected results. Neither did the initiatives bring an end to the conflict, but from the view of leaders of the various armed militant groups, only served to divert attention from the agitations while oil production continued. In a way, this was due to the fact that these agencies were not well grounded and powerful enough to succeed in addressing the issues at the root of the conflict or that the required political will to drive the process through was not there. The commissions and interventionist agencies did not end the search for peace anyway.
Amnesty as Conflict Management strategy

To tackle the situation created, the Nigerian government has also found the granting of amnesty as means of mending bridges with insurgents in the oil rich region. The General Yakubu Gowon regime in May 1967 had pardoned the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) including its leader, Isaac Adaka Boro – after a Twelve Day Revolution in 1966. Almost all Boro’s fighters were absorbed into the Nigerian Army as a way of reengaging them into service to the nation and to gain their confidence in a united Nigeria. Boro who was later decorated a major of the Nigerian Army at the age of 30 years fought against the Biafran soldiers during the Nigerian Civil War, though he consequently died in the process (Boro, 1982). At the end of the war, Gowon also took a reconciliatory step of declaring an amnesty to fighters on Biafran side in the early 1970s. He centered his policy of reintegration and rehabilitation on three Rs namely Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation of which the Niger Delta people were part. He further established structures such as the National Youth Service Corps scheme to foster national unity (Osaghae, 2011).

Years later, in 2004 under the Olusegun Obasanjo presidency, a “cash for arms” amnesty was introduced to manage the fierce inter-cult struggle between Asari-Dokubo’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and Tom Ateke’s Niger Delta Vigilantes and their affiliate groups in Rivers state. That process failed to end the intense battle between the major groups after six months of its commencement, though huge quantity of weapons was recovered. Asari-Dokubo alone ceded 2,377 G3 riffs, 611 AK-47s, 47 GPMGs and 2 rocket launchers (Emuedo, 2013). However, reports released by the International Crisis Group in 2006 had that most of those arms and ammunition were unserviceable and unfit for fighting (Alao, 2010).

This strategy of conflict management during the Gowon and Obasanjo regimes could not succeed in building a national consciousness (Agbede, 2010; Davis, 2009) because the scheme at that time had not been comprehensive enough to include basic modalities of how the fundamental issues at the root of the conflict were to be addressed by the Federal Government, neither did formulation of the scheme involve all other stakeholders nor was it undertaken by a nationally coordinating body or agency to handle the entire peace building mechanism. The reinsertion programmes, vocational training and job placements for the militants that were planned under Obasanjo’s 2004 “cash for arms” initiatives were also not part of any comprehensive process. Neither disarmament nor demobilization of ex-militants was seriously intended, let alone pursued as the Federal Government obviously at the time was unserious about seeking genuine peace. Consequently, the 2004 amnesty allowed the militants to buy time and use this, along with money paid to the leaders of the various armed groups, to purchase newer and better weapons (Aaron & George, 2010; Junger 2007).

Apparently, prior to 2009 when the current amnesty was initiated, the conflict conditions in the Niger Delta had brought up new interest that the path to lasting peace did not lie in military solution (Ojo, 2012; Oluwaniyi, 2011). Thus, in 2009 the late President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua as a way of tackling the protracted struggle proclaimed amnesty and unconditional pardon for all the armed militants in the region. Unlike those preceding it, the amnesty was intended for all who involved directly or indirectly in the commission of offences associated with militancy in the Niger Delta (Egwemi, 2010).

The programme had three components namely- disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), in exchange for weapons held by the warlords for rehabilitation and resettlement, while a “Mashall-type” intervention plan was to be implemented for tackling the basic issues at the root of the conflict including those of environmental despoliation and the deplorable social systems.
Indeed, the programme was a major step for bringing about the desired peace in that troubled enclave. Huge quantity of weapons was reined-in to the government forces within a period of 60 days moratorium which opened between August 6 and October 4, 2009. Several militant groups including the Niger Delta Vigilance Force, the Martyrs Brigade, and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), Niger Delta Vigilantes Services (NDVS), People’s Liberation Force (PLF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and a host of groups participated in the disarmament exercise. Major militant leaders and their footmen had surrendered their weapons and embraced the intended peace regime. This strategy of conflict management unlike those of the past was greeted with euphoria mixed with skepticism about the government’s sincerity in keeping to its promises (Osah and Amakihe, 2014).

Securing of oil facilities
In addition to the amnesty programme, as in most peace deals in comparative perspective tend to be cemented and oiled by huge monetary incentives and other donations often given to leaders of major armed dissident groups as part of package of incentives for “winning them over”. The Nigerian experience with the commencement of the amnesty programme has not been an exception. Thus, further to the amnesty initiative, another way the Federal Government acceded to ensuring peace was to allow the Nigeria National Petroleum Company (NNPC) to commence paying Mujahid Dokubo-Asari $9 million a year to pay his 4,000 former foot soldiers to protect the pipelines they attacked in the past since 2011. NNPC also signed a $22.9 million-a-year contract with Government Ekpemupolo to guard and maintain pipelines which his boys previously attacked. NNPC also pays $3.8 million yearly apiece to ‘Generals’ Ebikabowei Victor Ben and Ateke Tom to have their men guard the Delta pipelines (Ubhenin, 2013). The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was also mandated by the Federal Government to award contracts to the ex-militant leaders as a way of diverting their minds away from disrupting oil flows (Hinshaw, 2012).

Payment and skills acquisition programmes
Considerable investment has been made concerning reintegration of the ex-militants, beginning with the initial monthly allowances of N20,000.00 and later pegged at N65,000.00, followed by giving of educational and vocational training in various skills acquisition programmes both at home and specific training institutions abroad. To date over 200 pilots have graduated from the aviation institutes across the globe. Another 8,000 and more have completed their skill acquisition programme in welding and fabrication, pipe line fitting, carpentry, plumbing, oil drilling and marine related activities, electrical installations, Information communication, crane duty operation, boat building etc., while over 5,000 who opted for education have completed or near completion (Osah, and Alao, 2014).

Failure of Previous Attempts at Tackling the Niger Delta Question
As highlighted above, there had been many commissions of inquiry set up to date for addressing the Niger Delta question. There had also been numerous reports submitted and recommendations made. Arising from these many investigative committees and reports of findings and recommendations, many agencies had been established, manned and funded by the Federal Government at different times, and charged with bringing peace and development to the Niger Delta region. But, most of the recommendations in the various reports were set aside, while the agencies set up failed to perform in their assigned task of development, mediation and security. Consequently, instead of becoming better, the situation worsened as conditions of poverty, unemployment and environmental despoliation increased. But the Government’s incapacity in
dealing with the Niger Delta question also became glaring, so also the failures of all past initiatives of the Government in tackling the problem. Hence, this section addresses the major reasons for the inability of the various strategies to achieve the desired goals:

**Bureaucratization**

The Government’s strategy and approach to the Niger Delta question over the years had consisted mainly of raising one agency after another to deal with the problem. This strategy of “conflict resolution by bureaucratization”, as we prefer to call it here, was responsible for the many “area-based” interventionist agencies, development board authorities, or commissions that have been established for the Niger Delta to-date. But this bureaucratization and multiplication of initiatives, including rampant rate of the establishment and replacement of agencies for dealing with the Niger Delta question, shows how the Government had over the years been handling the issues involved in the conflict with levisy. For example, there have been writers especially from the early 1990s onwards who would argue that issues about rising human insecurity, declining means of livelihoods, and environmental despoliation most of which resulting from the operations of transnational companies required not only throwing one Government bureaucracy after the order at the problem, but setting up a ‘Marshall-type’ intervention mounted by the Federal Government and with the assistance of other important stakeholders such as the State Governments of the oil-producing areas, Development partners and Donors agencies from the international community, and of course the multinational oil corporations implicated in the Niger Delta (Obi, 2009; Iannaccone, 2007).

In any case, the strategy of conflict resolution by bureaucratization involving setting up one agency after another, did not achieve much results. Meanwhile, the fact of the establishment of those commissions, their operations and/or continuing existence in the case of both the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) of 2000 and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) of 2008 had tendered to create a false impression that work was either done or being done regarding the Niger Delta question. The inadequacies of those agencies in providing solutions to the developmental and human security challenges of the area gave the people of the region the feeling that the successive Nigerian Governments had not been sincere in addressing their peculiarities and plight. More so, the Federal Government’s control of these agencies had been so excessive, centralized and top down, with only little collaboration and partnership with States and Local Governments (Ukiwo, 2011; Omotola, 2007; Ekpo, 2004).

**Delay in budgeting and Release of funds**

Issues of delays in budgeting; in the release of budgeted funds, and in the receipt of only portions of the budgeted funds impacted negatively on the functions of these agencies (Ikelegbe, 2010); while the difficulties of inter-governmental relations those issues created, and the lack of synergies between those three levels of government had resulted in their been not a focused and concentrated approach to the resolution of the Niger Delta question. Omotala & Patrick (2010) had argued that the reasons for the failure of those agencies to bring about the desired peace and development were mainly because they were externally imposed, class mediated and comprehensively lopsided. Just as Wangbu (2005) says the developmental projects embarked by those agencies were essentially ‘cosmetic’ and distorting the genuine development aspiration of the people. Obviously, these efforts were almost all superficial and characterized by insincerity, ad hoc and showed lack of adequate political will (Ojakoroku and Gilbert, 2010) and efforts amounted to what in medical parlance is called “placebo” (Aaron & George, 2010), or in the words of Nwachukwu (2008) mere “palliatives”. 


Underfunding
Poor funding has been cited as another reoccurring issue why those interventionist agencies did not succeed. This obviously was noticed as far back as 1969 when General Yakubu Gowon slashed the 50% budget allocation to 20% and outright discontinuation of the funding to Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) because of the exigencies of the time and the central need for more funds for prosecuting the Nigeria Civil war (Ekpo, 2004). After the war, there was no reversal, resulting in NDDB being allowed to die. Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) which the government established in 1992 suffered the same fate; the funds credited to its account were withdrawn for use by other Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies (Omotola & Patrick, 2010). The NDDC that was to get 15% as monthly statutory allocation from the federation account as provided for in its establishment Act got only 10% released annually. The funds due from the three tiers of Government (federal, state and local government) were not forthcoming. The result was that during the first five years of its operations, NDDC had operated from deficit budget (Ekpo, 2004).

The current amnesty programme has been running relatively smoothly since its introduction, the Nigerian Government has been the major provider of funds for the implementation of its DDR components. Meanwhile, a large proportion of monies budgeted for and expended on the amnesty projects—estimated at ranging between 70%-80% have tended to be payments for business contractors, and emoluments of government employees while the remaining was used for stipend for the militants (Ubhenin, 2013; Nwajiaku-Dahou, 2010).

Corruption
Most of the interventionist agencies had become avenues for politicians, friends and family of the board members to take their chunk of the ‘national cake’. Those who got contracts from the agencies, delivered poor quality jobs or never bothered to do anything after getting their mobilization fees and still went away with it. When projects were executed, they were without monitoring and the result was abandoned projects littering all over the region. These abandoned projects turned hideouts to bandits. OMPADEC for instance came to be characterized with misappropriation of funds and mismanagement. The issue of corruption was so open that its first two chairmen, namely: Chief A.K. Horsfall and Professor Eric Opia were dismissed from the Commission. Similarly, the first ten years of NDDC was characterized by the same cankerworm which caused its leadership to be changed (Omotola & Patrick, 2010; Omotola, 2007).

Lack of Political Will
The lack of political will on the part of Government to address the basic issues at the root of the conflict had been a central consideration explaining the failures of previous Governments’ initiatives regarding the Niger Delta question since independence. The Government either failed to include all the groups in its dialogue or failed to keep to its promises (Campbell, 2010). This lack of ‘political will’ to tackle the situation had continued until 2009 when the administration of late President Yar’Adua took a decisive move to tackle the conflict headlong. Successive Nigerian governments had thought that by addressing peculiarities of the Delta region would generate more national and conflictual issues. The recommendations of those previous commissions were out rightly swept aside or implemented in part. Hence, one of the chairmen of committees set up by the Federal Government-Barrister Ledun Mitee heading the Technical Committee of the Niger Delta-once had cause to observe that in cases where some of the recommendations were considered, they were taken out of context and implemented in piecemeal, and without the required enthusiasm, consistency and monitoring. Not surprisingly, the conflict in the Niger Delta grew in intensity year by year, even as the levels of violence
increased. To date, there is no legal framework for the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme, such as an official gazette and/or an act of the National Assembly (Osah, 2014).

**Increasing Reliance on purely Military Means**
The Government had relied on military force, as a strategy for solving the problem, itself based on wrong diagnosis of the underlying sources of the conflict, coupled with too much concern with “national security”. This strategy of violent repression by the Nigerian state proved counter-productive anyway, since it failed to end the conflict. The operations of military personnel with different code names: ‘Operation Salvage’, ‘Operation Flush’, ‘Rivers State Task Force’, ‘Operation Hakuri 1 and 11’, ‘Joint Task Force’, were accompanied by large scale human rights abuses, looting and destruction of property, at times sacking of entire communities, arson, extortion, rape, maiming, torture, general intimidation of the people, brutality, unlawful arrests and detention, killing of several hundreds and thousands innocent citizens. These repressive actions which are too many to catalogue had created apprehension, fear, uncertainty and an ungovernable environment in the Niger Delta (see table below for a tabular representation) (Anifowose, 2011; Agbede, 2010; Ojakorotu & Gilbert, 2010; Adebayo, 2009; Courson, 2006).

**Military attacks on the Niger Delta since 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Location/incident</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Security agency involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Umuechem community (Rivers State)</td>
<td>October 31, 1990</td>
<td>MOPOL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Biara Village in Ogoni (Rivers State)</td>
<td>April 1993</td>
<td>Nigeria Police Force (Internal Security Task Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and 8 others</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Under the General Sani Abacha instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Harassment of Choba community (Rivers State)</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>MOPOL &amp; Nigeria Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Invasion of Odi Community (Bayelsa State)</td>
<td>November 1999</td>
<td>Nigeria Amr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Attack on Liama community (Bayelsa State)</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Nigeria Amr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Attack on Okerekoko community (Bayelsa State)</td>
<td>March 2003</td>
<td>Nigeria Amr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bombardment of Odioma Town (Bayelsa State)</td>
<td>February 19, 2003</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shelling of Gbaramatu Kingdom (Delta State)</td>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
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*Source: Authors compilation*

**Concluding Remarks**
Nigeria’s introduction of amnesty and implementation of a DDR programme for militants in the Niger Delta since 2009 is one the “boldest, realistic and pragmatic” moves by the federal government for tackling the protracted conflict in Niger Delta. However, there has been no legal framework on which the Amnesty Programme is hinged on. This partly accounts for the pace of progress in social and economic reconstruction not matching the relative success achieved at the
disarmament and demobilization phases. Besides, two of the key agencies charged with functions in those other areas namely the Niger Delta Development commission and Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs were found not to perform optimally due to a combination of factors including bureaucratization, underfunding and corruption.

The Federal Government should Gazette the Amnesty Programme and provide adequate funding for developmental and reconstruction projects since continuing political will is needed to drive the process. Meanwhile, the lack of this will carry the risk of truncating the tentative peace induced by the Amnesty.

There is also the need for synergy between the key agencies of Government at all levels: federal, state and local and the multinational oil companies implicated in the challenge of the Niger Delta, to coordinate the activities and work in harmony with the view of delivering peace dividends to the people of the Niger Delta.

There is an urgent need to revisit the various land decrees which were the creations of the military dictatorial regimes, especially the Petroleum Control Degrees of 1967; Petroleum Act of 1968 which had alienated the people of the Niger Delta from ownership of the oil resource in their area with a view of repelling them and replacing them with people centered laws that would reflect the tenets of a federal state which Nigeria practices.

Reference


