

NIGERIA'S POSTNEOLIBERAL DEFICIENCY SYNDROME

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Abstract

This study is critically about the reading of the writing on the wall in Nigeria, the neoliberal antecedents of the Nigerian state, the Boko Haram disaster and the consequent postneoliberal possibilities in the embattled Nigerian nation-state. It has been demonstrated in the study that as a matter of fact, the widely proclaimed religious interpretation of insurgent tendencies in Nigeria is only a neoliberal rationalization of what portends to be the most critical exemplar of Nigeria's postneoliberal challenges. Findings of the study have led to the conclusion that in essence, the war against terror in Nigeria must encompass wars against the terrors of hunger and starvation, the terror of disease, the terror of illiteracy and indeed, the terror of relative deprivation. The Boko Haram debacle in the meantime, remains the strongest manifestation of deficient postneoliberal possibilities in the country

KEYWORDS: Boko Haram, Nigeria, Neoliberalism, Postneoliberalism, Deficiency Syndrome

INTRODUCTION

Nnamdi Azikiwe was the first President of the currently embattled Nigerian nation-state and the foremost nationalist strategist for the political independence of Nigeria from Britain in October 1960. In Azikiwe (1980:175), he had declared as follows: I honestly believe that when a team of dedicated Nigerians with a sense of mission, patriotic vision and inspired imagination assume the reins of government, they can not fail to read the writing on the wall. Hence, this study is critically about the reading of the writing on the wall, the neoliberal antecedents of the Nigerian state, the Boko Haram disaster and consequent postneoliberal possibilities in Nigeria. In essence, the Nigerian State is witnessing in Boko Haram a truly deadly disaster. However, it is also possible that the occasioning mortal mayhem signifies an inevitable consequence of a mismanaged neoliberal tendency in Nigeria. Hence Anyadike (2013:12) argues that the sect's (Boko Haram's) blossoming could also be said to have been aided by the prevailing economic dislocation in Nigerian, vis-a-vis the introduction of party politics and politics of anxiety, the associated desperation of politicians for political power, and the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, who, though they did not actively embark on mutiny, but either did nothing to impede it from fomenting or only feebly condemned it. Furthermore, the deadly phenomenon of Boko Haram has become the consummate manifestation of structural discontent in Nigeria. Beyond the structural discontents however, Boko Haram also represents an overt window to an

intra-ethnic animosity, covered by the current neoliberal political and economic posturing of the Nigerian elite. Hence, John Campbell, a former U.S. ambassador to Nigeria and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, thinks Boko Haram is among other things, a movement of grassroots anger among northern people at the continuing depravation and poverty in the north (Walker, 2012:9).

For further example, as Boko Haram remains overtly Northern Nigerian denominated, it is not obvious to the average Northern Nigerian citizen, what have been his benefits from the collective resistance of the Northern Nigerian neoliberals, to the vexatious issue of resource control; as particularly championed by the resource rich South-South geo-political region. The bemusing resistance of the Northern Nigerian neoliberals to resource control therefore contains in its womb, some seeds of Northern intra-ethnic animosity as also represented by Boko Haram. All said and done, resource control in the lexicology of Nigeria's political economy is the euphemism for who among the elite or which of the neoliberal regions would control more of the petro-naira that flows from Nigeria's oil-rich resources. According to Walker (2012:7) Boko Haram, as a group, clearly does not utterly reject the modern world out of hand. The group's use of mobile phones, video cameras, DVDs, YouTube, chemical explosives, automatic weapons, and cars shows it is more than prepared to use the fruits of Western education when it suits them. Boko Haram is, however, against those in northern Nigeria known as "*yan boko*." Yan boko is literally translated as "child of the book." It refers to the elite created by the policy of indirect rule used by the British to colonize Nigeria—the people who have had their heads turned away from Allah by easy money and corrupting Western values. To be yan boko is to be spiritually and morally corrupt, lacking in religious piety, and guilty of criminally enriching oneself rather than dedicating oneself to the Muslim *umma* (community).

As a matter of fact, the widely proclaimed religious interpretation of insurgent tendencies in Nigeria (see Anyadike, 2013:21), is only a neoliberal rationalization of what portends to be the most critical exemplar of Nigeria's postneoliberal challenges. The clear truth is that the Nigerian state is immensely tolerant of both neoliberal Islam and neoliberal Christianity. To that extent, neoliberalism records the secularity of the Nigerian State as a settled issue. The worrisome scenario that must border the orthodox Nigerian neoliberal statesman (but does not) is the reaction of postneoliberal actors and their current forerunners to the whole issue of secularity. Fundamentally, there are postneoliberal pundits and strategists in both Nigerian Islam and Nigerian Christianity. Where the extremist postneoliberal Islamic pundit may profess certain jihadist inclinations, his Christian counterpart also professes preparedness for counter measures that to all intents and purposes, are not secular. The extremist preparations of the postneoliberal Christian challenger, as currently professed, are also not classifiable as the effusions of some egregious weaklings, even in their utter indefiniteness. Crisis Group (2014) posits:

Nigeria is a fractured state. It is rich but Nigerians are poor, many extremely so. Since returning to civilian rule in 1999, the state has suffered growing security, capacity and legitimacy gaps, demonstrated in the declining capacity of its institutions to deliver public goods, including security, transportation, water, medical care, power and education. A prominent section of the elite thrives on crony capitalism and patron-client deals in violation of the rule of law. Its members are from different ethnic, political and religious communities; when they agree on how to share the spoils all is well, but when they disagree, they politicize, manipulate and instrumentalize ethno-religious and regional differences. With the failure of governance and development, an ever increasing

number of ethnic militias, separatist groups and millenarian religious movements are being mobilized, both for self-defense and for pressing ideological and practical goals

Moreover, suppositions of the misuse and perhaps outright looting of state appropriations for security purposes are rife in the analysis of the neoliberal crisis in Nigeria. These suppositions are already, manifest indictments of neoliberalism and its deliberate *laissez-faire* tendencies, occasioning in some instances, conspiratorial contract scams. Oxfam International (2008:13) posits that overall; Nigeria suffers from non-transparent and inadequately controlled military spending. In searching for the new security technology that have been procured from the security budgets, you look more and see less; you are finally told that the supposed new technology are in software. In addition, you are told that these matters are mainly military matters and are therefore not truly for public disclosures, going by professional etiquette and again, for security reasons. Neoliberalism has therefore developed a game of communalizing costs and privatizing profits (Brie, 2009:27). Furthermore, in making these exploratory postulations, there is need for conceptual explications and invariably the operationalization of key concepts. We therefore further proceed as follows:

Neoliberalism: Over the last 30 years, neoliberal policies have been implemented in almost every society on the globe (Brand and Sekler, 2009:5). According to Peters (1999), Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992) is probably the single most influential individual economist or political philosopher to shape what is now understood as neo-liberalism, although he is best regarded, and considered himself, as a classical liberal. It was during the decade of the 1980s that Hayek's political and economic philosophy was used by Thatcher and Reagan to legitimate the neo-liberal attack on 'big government' and the bureaucratic welfare state with a policy mix based on 'free' trade and the establish of the 'open' economy: economic liberalisation or rationalisation characterized by the abolition of subsidies and tariffs, floating the exchange rate, the freeing up of controls on foreign investment; the restructuring of the state sector, including corporatization and privatization of state trading departments and other assets, 'downsizing', 'contracting out', the attack on unions and abolition of wage bargaining in favour of employment contracts; and, finally, the dismantling of the welfare state through commercialization, 'contracting out', 'targeting' of services, and individual 'responsibilization' for health, welfare and education. On this view there is nothing distinctive or special about education or health; they are services and products like any other, to be traded in the marketplace (Peters, 1999). However, neoliberalism met its definitive end with the crisis that erupted in 2008. There is no going back. By itself, the market is self-destructive. It has to be supported and contained. Capitalist society, arbitrated by the market, either plunders itself or becomes uncontained. It lacks long-term perspectives (Cecena, 2009:33).

In this paper, neoliberalism stands for the new form of liberalism that sort to restore the affairs of men to the control of market forces, after a period of what the practitioners perceived as state meddlesomeness.

Postneoliberalism: Brand and Sekler (2009) consider postneoliberalism as a perspective on social, political and/or economic transformations, on shifting terrains of social struggles and compromises, taking place on different scales, in various contexts and by different actors. All postneoliberal approaches have in common that they break with some specific aspect of 'neoliberalism' and embrace different aspects of a possible postneoliberalism, but these approaches vary in depth, complexity and scope, as well as everyday practices and

comprehensive concepts. With the help of the term postneoliberalism we aim to create a space for shared reflection on questions like: Where are the stabilities of neoliberal configurations (Brand and Sekler, 2009)? We denote postneoliberalism as the phenomenon in world affairs that comes after neoliberalism

Deficiency Syndrome: Postneoliberalism has not essentially connoted negativity. To suggest that its dynamics are critically negative would allude to the possibilities of an end to civilization. Essentially therefore, postneoliberalism is about another fundamentally new worldview. If in a particular region or nation-state, this new worldview is deficient of positive dynamics, such a region or country, invariably suffers from a postneoliberal deficiency syndrome.

THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF BOKO HARAM: A CONDENSED ACCOUNT

According to Adibe (2014), Boko Haram members prefer to be known by their Arabic name - *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad*—meaning “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad.” The group is believed to have been formed in the town of Maiduguri in northeast Nigeria, where the locals nicknamed its members “Boko Haram,” a combination of the Hausa word “boko,” which literally means “Western education” and the Arabic word “haram” which figuratively means “sin” and literally means “forbidden.” While the popular belief is that it was founded around 2001 or 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, some have argued that the sect was actually started in 1995 as Sahaba. The group claims to be opposed not only to Western civilization (which includes Western education) but also to the secularization of the Nigerian state. There is a fair consensus that, until 2009, the group conducted its operations more or less peacefully and that its radicalization followed a government clampdown in 2009, in which some 800 of its members were killed. The group's leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was also killed after that attack while in police custody (Adibe, 2014). Nigeria's dysfunctional state has tragically failed many of its people, particularly in the north. Key human development sectors – education, health and the judiciary, as well as the security agencies – are poorly funded or underperforming. Not even the Universal Basic Education (UBE) budget has been spared, with serious harm to school enrolment. In the north, millions of *Almajiri* students are sent to Quranic schools far from their families and required to beg for alms (*Almajiranchi*) or work as domestic help to pay for their upkeep.¹⁷ In a context of urbanization and increasing poverty, this practice is open to abuse and may foster criminality.¹⁸ In cities like Kano and Kaduna, many *Almajiri* have graduated into *Yandaba*, adolescent groups that once socialized teenagers into adulthood but have in many cases become gangs. In 2005, the National Council for the Welfare of the Destitute estimated there were seven million *Almajiri* children in northern Nigeria (Crisis Group, 2014:4).

SENDING THE STATE TO SLEEP: THE NEOLIBERAL ELIXIR

Boko Haram grew gradually. It was not suddenly unleashed on the Nigerian state. Unfortunately, while the state was asleep, nothing could have been done to nip in the bud, the imploding monstrosity. A particularly tragic output of the neoliberally induced siesta of the Nigerian State is the complete disappearance of comforting and inspiring speeches from Nigeria's public sector. There are no new public sector figures in the current Nigerian national space with the positive oratorical skills of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (former President of Nigeria), Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (former Prime Minister) and Chief Obafemi Awolowo (former Premier of Western Region). Paradoxically, it is indicative of the unworthy neoliberal worldviews of these otherwise able statesmen, that their positively oratorical leadership traits; produced no national heirs

(apparent or non-apparent). In covering this lacuna, faith based pretenders began to excel in creating speeches with unprogressive worldviews and total hate. There is an intricate link in Nigeria between politics, governance, corruption, poverty and violence. Politics is largely driven by money. Elected officials are hardly accountable to citizens. The well-connected exercise undue influence according to the strength of their purse and the strings they can pull. The various elite factions – political, economic/business, bureaucratic, traditional and religious – have been drawn into a political economy driven by huge oil receipts and implicated in wide-scale and systemic corruption. Nigeria is consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries. This has denied millions opportunities...When corruption and clientelism do not work, politicians often revert to violence to achieve their aims. “Godfathers” use thugs and militias to intimidate opponents and in the vicious, sometimes deadly struggles for local power or against other ethnic or sectarian groups (Crisis Group, 2014:2). It was in the midst of all these that the Nigerian State went to bed.

Still within the context of a state that went to bed, the dearth of spirited orators on the national leadership scene and the filling of the resultant lacuna by faith based birds of passage; the case of Boko Haram is highly instructive. The Nigerian State was busy producing neoliberal medications for the political economy. In the meantime, an apparent overdose of the medications by the state’s voodoo pharmacologists (who must taste their prescriptions) and the citizen-recipients of these medications, turned out to be sleep-inducing. The only citizens who remained fully awake were the faith-based orators. Crisis Group (2014:7) describes Mohammed Yusuf, the pioneer leader of the Boko Haram sect, as a charismatic and popular *Malam* (Quranic scholar) who spoke widely throughout the north. In the case of Nigeria’s neoliberal political economy, it has since ceased to produce charismatic speakers, either travelling or stationary types. According to Crisis Group (2014:9), Yusuf was always political, wanting an Islamic government, but not violent. But that changed over time as more radical lieutenants pushed the movement in more confrontational directions. We therefore contend that while all this were taking place, the neoliberal Nigerian state was still asleep. The ideology of neoliberalism and its market justice cousin had so much incapacitated the slumbering Nigerian State that it did not quite take note of the fact that radical elements were beginning to wake up here and there in the Nigerian environment. In his study on the failure of the Nigerian State to meet up with its responsibilities towards its citizens, Fajonyomi (2012) concludes that:

One thing is certain. The State has gone to sleep. No wonder marauders have taken over certain basic services that the State ought to provide be it security (Oodua Peoples Congress, Egbesu Boys and Niger Delta Vigilante Force) traffic (members of National Union of Road Transport Workers or even the physically disabled members of the community on skaters), health (too numerous to mention) education (every street now has private schools), infrastructure (private bridges link some isolated communities and potholes are filled by miscreants).

NEOLIBERALISM AND THE PROVOCATION OF UNRESTRAINED VIOLENCE IN NIGERIA

Let it be noted that the latent Nigerian worldview has never truly tolerated neoliberal practices. We recall that while the international neoliberal tendencies were critically evolving in the early to mid-sixties, the radical wing of the Nigerian intelligentsia, e.g., Professor Ikenna Nzimiro; the cream of the Nigerian Labour Movement, e.g., Mr Mbazulike Amechi, Mr.Micheal Imoudu; the

progressives in the political arena, e.g., Mallam Aminu Kano and Sir Mokwugo Okoye and of course, the radical elements in the Nigerian military, all in unison, usually reacted negatively to the burgeoning domestic neoliberal manifestations in Nigeria. Aribisala (2014) may not therefore be very far from the truth when he posits that we are all Boko Haram! But in a more critical dimension, the policies of neoliberal optimization that several Nigerian governments, both military and civilian have experimentally implemented; have also largely left Nigeria's teeming youth population, immensely neglected and bewildered.

Within Northern Nigeria itself, the Northeast - the base of Boko Haram's operations - has one of the largest concentrations of people Franz Fanon would call the "Wretched of the Earth." - Many of these people are either unemployed or underemployed, and therefore suffer from various forms of what Ted Gurr would call "relative deprivation" (Adibe, 2014). According to Nwankpa (2014:69), the motive behind Boko Haram's violent activities is one that is difficult to identify. But that is only in the specific terms of who sponsors the insurgents and who would they attack next. In generic terms, Boko Haram is a condemnable violent reaction to Nigeria's neoliberal pretences. The financial recklessness and extravagance of many former (and serving) governors is well documented. Debts have soared, and many states face bankruptcy. Some of the money used for corruption, patronage and political violence by governors comes from "security votes", joint state/local government accounts and money laundering. The "security vote" is "a budget line that is meant to act as a source of discretionary spending that the executive can use to respond quickly and effectively to threats to peace and security". It is the most abused budget item, because there is no oversight (Crisis Group, 2014:2).

According to Walker (2012:14), Northern Nigeria as a whole has very deep development problems, perhaps deeper than the rest of the country. It has some of the worst maternal and infant mortality rates in the world. The level of poverty and deprivation is higher than the rest of the country, while active participation in politics, beyond fealty to a thin band of political and religious godfathers who hold power, is low. The only way to remove the threat of the group in the long term is widespread reform of northern Nigeria that improves the livelihoods of northern Nigerians, and gives them a bigger stake in their politics (Walker, 2012:14).

The truth is that neoliberalism and its capitalist pedigree encourage the philosophy of survival of the fittest. But in the Nigerian circumstances, something absolutely contradictory became a feature of neoliberalism, to the effect that Providence has so generously endowed the Nigerian State with seemingly inexhaustible natural resources. It would not have been preposterous therefore, to expect Nigeria to gravitate towards a welfare state. However, the state chose to remain unapologetically neoliberal, irrespective of the party in power. According to Fayemi (2013), Nigeria is still afflicted by bad governance, illiteracy, injustice, inequity, incompetence, want and misery despite earning over 400 billion dollars from oil sale alone over the last five decades. Edame and Effiong (2013:1) submit that the oil sector in Nigeria has generated huge revenue to the Nigerian Economy, yet the prevalent economic situation rather than showcasing the benefits from this economic driver of Nigeria, depicts a divergent view about the economy. In the face of the neoliberal tendencies of the state, the financial inflows arising from Nigeria's oil resources have been perpetually cornered by the elite, to the abject detriment of the masses, left at the mercy of the philosophy of survival of the fittest.

Furthermore argues Edame and Effiong (2013:1), the discovery of oil in any economy both developed and developing is always marked with serious celebration heralding the advent of economic growth and development, as a result of the anticipated flow of revenue. However, the advent of oil in Nigeria has been both a blessing and curse to the Nigerian economy. Oil brought

with it much revenue and this was seen as a blessing to the economy, because it enhanced the prospects of economic growth and development of the country. But in recent times, Nigeria's leaders have enhanced the negative effect through their quest to meet their selfish interest amassing wealth. They completely abandoned the masses to their individual and collective fate. It was this abandonment of the masses to their individual and collective fate that principally fans the embers of violence in Nigeria. According to Edame and Effiong (2013:1):

For more than five decades since oil was discovered and exploited in Nigeria, the country's economic policy formulations have entirely been embedded in this single resource of nature, thereby making Nigeria depend solely and vulnerable to international oil price booms and bursts. The paradox of plenty used to describe the Nigerian oil sector development is the relationship between resource abundance and bad economic policies, underdevelopment, poverty and conflict prevalence in most oil rich countries. The presence of oil or minerals gives rise to rent seeking and corruption, which adversely affect the climate for investment and growth. But the deeper sense in which natural resources impede the development of institutions is that they minimize the two-way interactions between the state and its citizens thereby causing social unrest and communal conflict.

To tell the truth, it was not resource abundance that was the problem, neither was it economic policies in abstract configurations; the entire critical issues have to do with the neoliberal bent of the political economy of Nigeria, which ultimately became violence-inducing. In recent times in Nigerian history therefore, Boko Haram has come to represent this neoliberally induced violent absurdity in Nigeria.

THE NEOLIBERAL ONSLAUGHT ON LABOUR AND THE SUBSEQUENT LACUNA

Indeed, at various points and on different scores, mainstream unionism in Nigeria, lost to the neoliberal circle, two erstwhile godfathers of effective protest in Nigeria. These were the maverick Adams Oshimole, former President of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) who became Governor of Nigeria's Edo State and also the cerebral Prof Attahiru Jega, who as National President of the Academic Staff Union of Universities in Nigeria (ASSU) gave sleepless nights to Nigeria's military demagogues, during the inglorious military era in Nigeria. Jega became Chairman of the neoliberal Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). In the case of Oshimole, the authentic Adams was lost to neoliberalism when he became Chairman of Nigeria's octopus National Social Insurance Trust Fund - NSITF (now restructured). Sitting atop the quixotic multibillion naira empire of stalled funds in NSITF, Comrade Adams must have come face-to-face with the aspects of neoliberalism that philosophically borders on realism. In the case of Prof Attahiru Jega, his going to INEC was obviously a major victory for the neoliberal political class in Nigeria and a monumental loss to the champions of popular struggle in Nigeria.

One of the most phenomenal international personalities of the 20th century was indisputably, the Hon Robert Nesta Marley, the Jamaican reggae music exponent, more popularly known as Bob Marley (As recipient of the Jamaican Order of Merit – OM – he became entitled to the usage of the prefix, "Honourable" before his names). One of Marley's epic songs was entitled "Rat Race". From the lyrics of "Rat Race" we present the following extracts:

Rat race!	Don't forget your history
I'm singing that	Know your destiny

When the cat's away	in the abundance of water
The mice will play	The fool is thirsty
Political violence fill ya city, ye-ah!	Rat race, rat race, rat race!
Don't involve Rasta in your say say	
Rasta don't work for no C.I.A	
Rat race, rat race, rat race! Rat race, I'm saying	
When you think it's peace and safety	
A sudden destruction	
Collective security for surety, ya-ah!	
Source: http://rock.rapgenius.com/Bob-marley-rat-race-lyrics#note-1756045	

In studying the wordings of the above composition, you would think that it was all about contemporary Nigerian circumstances. Indeed, among the song's apposite Nigerian prognostications is the analogy of when the cat's away and the mice takes over. It is essentially posited in this regard in this study, that if the Nigerian state had not in a neoliberal manner emasculated the labour movement, insurgents would not have taken over (note that the Nigerian local orthodoxy is to join the international stakeholders in the current Nigerian security crisis, to call the marauders insurgents). Hence in Nigeria, poverty has been increasing despite relatively strong economic growth; 112.5 million - over 70 per cent of the population – are classified as poor and absolutely poor. Sokoto state in the North West has the highest poverty rate (86.4 per cent), Niger state in North Central the lowest. The North East, Boko Haram's main operational field, has the worst poverty rate of the six official "zones" (Crisis Group, 2014:2). Fundamentally, bad governance, sustained economic hardship, rising inequality and social frustration are fostering the growth of radical extremist groups. Boko Haram, the latest in a long list of northern fundamentalist movements, has tapped into Muslim revivalism in the north. A major challenge for the region's traditional, religious and political elites became how to rein it in and work with federal and state authorities to find a route out of the quagmire (Crisis Group, 2014:1). In the midst of all this the labour movement remained in the neoliberal tradition completely emasculated. According to Peters (1999), we might say that neo-liberalism, historically, was at its strongest during the era of the trans-Atlantic partnership between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, during the decade of the 1980s, and its dominance began to wane in the 1990s. Yet by 2014, neoliberalism remains an apparent Nigerian orthodoxy. Peters (1999) further highlights:

By the 1980s neo-liberalism both as a political philosophy and policy mix had taken deep root. During that decade many governments around the world supported the modernizing reforms thrust of neo-liberalism, particularly the exposure of the state sector to competition and the opportunity to pay off large and accumulating national debts. By contrast, many developing countries had 'structural adjustments policies' imposed upon them as loans conditions from the IMF and WB. The reforming zeal soon ideologised the public sector *per se* and ended by damaging key national services (including health and education). By the mid-Nineties, the wheel had turned again - this time towards a realization that the dogmatism of the neo-liberal right had become a serious treat to social justice, to national cohesion, and to democracy itself. Large sections of populations had become structurally disadvantaged, working and living, on the margins of the labour market; rapidly growing social inequalities had become more evident as the rich had become richer and the poor, poorer; companies were failing and under-performing; public services had been 'stripped down' and were unable to deliver even the most basic of

services; many communities had become split and endangered by the rise of racism, crime, unemployment and social exclusion. National governments throughout the world looked to a new philosophy and policy mix—one that preserved some of the efficiency and competition gains but did not result in the forms of social splitting and exclusions (Peters, 1999).

THE REALITY OF POSTNEOLIBERAL POSSIBILITIES IN NIGERIA: A PROGNOSIS

The uncertainty concerning the future leads us to characterize it more as the negation of a stage that is being exceeded (Cecena, 2009:34). The postneoliberal phenomenon is an imminent reality. The question is not whether we would get to that stage. The more germane concern is about the shape of postneoliberal occurrences in Nigeria. A salient factor in all of this is that Boko Haram is a pointer to the possibilities of postneoliberal confusion in the country. There may also be some positive postneoliberal developments. We consider these two scenarios:

Regrouping of Labour

It would be incorrect to conclude that Labour has been mortally wounded in Nigeria and elsewhere. Neoliberal contradictions are highly likely to force the currently emasculated Labour to rediscover its aboriginal radicalism. Neoliberalism had given Labour the impression that Uhuru could be obtained in its womb. However, Labour has been discovering in Nigeria that in place of Uhuru, neoliberal pregnancy has rather given birth to a series of monsters which include; structural adjustment, downsizing, rightsizing, belt-tightening, endless restructuring and finally terrorism, with the neoliberal alias of insurgency. In the imaginations of this study, it is not likely that the Labour Movement in Nigeria would continue ad nauseam to allow the so-called insurgents to cover the lacuna created by neoliberal shenanigan in Nigeria. By renewal, replacement and reformation, new entrants are invariably joining the Nigerian workforce. When the new entrants realize that a priori, there has to be a state to call their own, before Uhuru becomes reality, they will mobilize to create such a state or number of states (as the case may become) from the current neoliberal unification in Nigeria. No one would then brand them insurgents, under what would have become a postneoliberal situation.

An Imminent Rise in Feminine Activism

There is also this strand of the postneoliberal possibilities that could materialize under feminine pulls. It is a corollary to the discovery by an emergent female labour force that a neoliberal state has left the citizenry stranded and bewildered. The truth is that in the girl-child's search for the promised neoliberal opportunities, she had been kidnapped and abused. Finally, she has reached where the opportunities are to be found, only to discover that there must be a state to call her own, before she would find meaning in such opportunities. Hence, she joins postneoliberal female activism. Two already possible leaders of the women vanguard are Joe Okoi-Odumakin – Charman of Campaign for Democracy and Leader of Women Arise; and Mrs Oby Ezekwesili – principal promoter of the bringbackourgirls activism in Nigeria. The postneoliberal Nigerian feminine activist would never be pliant to male dominance. She is more likely to push for more opportunities in governance structures, till she covers enough grounds to jettison the neoliberal structures that have delivered unfulfilled promises. There is the postneoliberal possibility that a female-dominated Supreme Court would by evolution, become a reality in Nigeria; whereupon the Court delivers an ultimate judgment that brings the Nigerian state to the point of

postneoliberal reality. The only necessary ingredient for the actuality of this prognosis is an enabling motion to that effect.

CONCLUSION

We share the views of Cecena (2009:42) that what is coming after neoliberalism is a wide range of multiple possibilities. Contrary to popular understanding therefore, Boko Haram does not represent the most dangerous currents in the Nigerian state. The most dangerous crisis in the Nigerian state, it must be highlighted, borders on the intransigence of Nigerian neoliberals who are in abject denial of a looming postneoliberal confusion. Critically speaking, the Boko Haram atrocities have been given impetus by the incapacity of the Nigerian state actors, in an age of postneoliberal possibilities, to read the handwriting on the wall. Hence, where Boko Haram horrendously decimates the population in tranches of tens and hundreds, at a time, an unsavory postneoliberal confusion, portends some more egregious possibilities. Therefore when Giroux and Gilpin (2014:2) ask: What have been the triggers of violence in Nigeria (by Boko Haram) and what are the factors sustaining it; theirs should not remain mere rhetorical questions. The triggers of violence in Nigeria and the factors sustaining it are respectively, chaotic and decadent neoliberal policies and also, insensitive neoliberal shenanigans of the ruling elite.

Thus, the most effective answer to Boko Haram and sundry insurgencies in Nigeria, is for the state to prove in concerted action that the welfare of sundry citizens are fully guaranteed. Hence, to checkmate postneoliberal confusion, the Nigerian State must rediscover her receding pedigree which we denote as dei-humanism in this study. At the core of dei-humanism is the belief in a Supreme Being whose worship is not the purpose of the state. The purpose of the state in dei-humanism is the welfare of the citizen. In de-humanism, the state remains a secular state (tolerant of religious nuances) but highly biased in favour of human welfare and economic security.

In essence, the war against terror in Nigeria must encompass wars against the terrors of hunger and starvation, the terror of disease, the terror of illiteracy and indeed, the terror of relative deprivation. In political terms, the war against terror must mean the moral equivalent of what Brie (2009:29) calls the democratization of democracy. Finally, Boko Haram may mean anything, from education is forbidden, to purveyors of unbridled violence in Nigeria. But above and beyond all that, Boko Haram is the ultimate syndrome of postneoliberal cataclysm in Nigeria. In this regard, the Boko Haram debacle in the meantime, remains the strongest manifestation of deficient postneoliberal possibilities in the country. It is in these contexts that we verily view Boko Haram as Nigeria's postneoliberal deficiency syndrome. Hence, to remain in denial of the reality of this syndrome promotes the course of an undesirably imminent state failure. To countervail this looming postneoliberal negativity, the state must begin today to compel its officials to emancipate themselves from the hallucinatory effects of neoliberal *déjà vu*, which the state adopts and invariably attempts to implement as state policies. Indeed, the required countervailing policies must be inclusively formulated and moreover, the resultant policies must be ardently implemented. Viewed pragmatically, it is obvious that our people will cease to harbour grievances about political iniquities, social inequality and economic insecurity when they have a country dedicated to the effective amelioration of social inequities (Azikiwe, 1980:175).

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