

ANNUAL APPROPRIATION AS INSTRUMENT OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC GOALS' ACTUALISATION: AN EVALUATION OF PUBLIC POLICING IN NIGERIA 2011–2018

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ABSTRACT

Annual Appropriation has been the instrument employed by the three tiers of government in Nigeria to mobilise, allocate, and manage resources towards the satisfaction of public needs and monitored through legislative oversight functions. This paper explored the relationship between budgeting and the delivery of good governance with a focus on Nigerian Police Force (NPF), 2011 to 2018. It is the responsibility of NPF to detect and prevent crimes, apprehend and prosecute offender, preserve law and order, protect life and property, and perform other functions as may be required of them by any Act. Empirical evidences reveal that in spite of increasing appropriation of fund to NPF, the Force has failed in its responsibilities. Dominant opinion in the literature tends to support under-funding and corruption as the cause of this failure. However, there is little or no assessment of NPF adherence to conventional budgetary processes, and its impact on the provision of good governance. Generally, this paper seeks to engage in these assessments. It adopted documentary research and content analysis wherein published and unpublished books, journals, conference and workshop papers, government and civil society documents found in Libraries and the internet were explored. The results of the analysis reveal that there is no relationship between the level of annual appropriation and NPF abysmal failure in its responsibilities. It also reveals that NPF does not practice conventional budgetary principles, which would have factored in their justifiable units' needs; the politicisation and use of the force by dominant ruling elites has negative impact on the image of the force and the approval of their budget proposals; NPF abandoned its conventional responsibilities for private and individual policing; and the unambiguous pursuit of individual economic interest of members of the force turned members of the public into preys. The paper recommends among others: NPF adoption of international budgeting best practices, the establishment of budget and planning department in all NPF Commands, introduction of compulsory budget seminars/workshops, and the establishment of police Special anti-abuse and ethics department to deal with deviants in the Force ranks and files.

KEYWORDS: Nigerian Police Force, budget, public policing, public good, good governance

1. INTRODUCTION

Provision of security and safety remain vital aspect of good governance indices and the aspiration of all known civilisation and culture. Survival remains the most important objective of any organisations, individuals, groups, nations and states or any human collectivises (Imobighe, 1999). It has been a necessary collective measure protection (individually or collectively) and to control or checkmate anti-social activities of some members (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2005; Oluwaniyi, 2011). Thus, the provision of security is the core responsibility of

any government or state. Special unit(s) is created or established and equipped by governments, legally empowered, and logically funded to provide this responsibility. The law invests this body of armed personnel with coercive power to uphold law and order. They are empowered to use force guided by civility, the Constitution, international conventions, and professional ethics in the discharge of their duties.

In this case, the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) is among such units established to provide safety and security of lives and property. Established in 1820, progressively reformed and equipped, and with the current staff strength of 522,253 (22,484 officers and 499,769 rank and file), NPF remains a critical stakeholder in the security industry that ensures the survival of the rule of law, regimes, public projects, and guarantees individual and group safety in spite of its excesses or abuse of power. The police play important facilitative and inhibitive roles because its personnel are involved in policing-securing compliance with existing laws and conformity with precepts of social order. They preserve order, safety and social relations in the Nigerian society that is characterized by diversities and contradictions arising from multiple racial affiliations and socio-religious cultures, population heterogeneity, urbanization, westernisation and economic development orthodoxies, and conflicting ideologies. These involves a variety of tasks and responsibilities, which include preventing crimes, protecting lives and property, enforcing the law, maintaining peace and public order, and providing a wide range of services to citizens as the need and requests arise (Susan-Martin, 1990). They are paid, equipped, and funded to give full-time attention to their responsibilities in the interest of citizens' welfare and existence.

However, documented evidences and incidences reveal high level NPF weakness and failure to achieve these objectives or perform their responsibilities (Wiley and Esbensen, 2013). This has manifested in the prevalence of or growing insecurity of lives and property, crimes and insurgency, terrorism and assassinations, kidnappings and armed robbery among others that are confronting Nigeria in the contemporary times (Okeineme, 2010; Baker 2002). Nigeria is currently experiencing violent crimes even in the rural areas, highway and bank robberies, widespread banditry, extremist terrorisms, and increasing lawlessness, rebellions, secessionist groups and militias' violence, citizens' abuse in the hand of personnel of state security agencies among others (Ibekwe, 2016; Aziken, 2010). Consequently, rural and urban communities have resorted to the use of untrained and poorly equipped civilians for surveillance and to secure their immediate environs. Regardless of other numerous state security outfits, the NPF has even adopted this people-oriented security measure that has been branded community policing as its 21st century approach to effective policing (Abiri, 2011). This is a self-defeatist NPF approach to its responsibilities.

Many scholars, analysts, and critics tend to blame the faces of police brutality and extra-judicial killings, politicisation, training and inefficiency, lawlessness, endemic corruption, poor salaries and allowances, and under-funding as the cause of NPF's failure to satisfy the public in the provision of its responsibilities (Lukman, 2014; Nwachukwu, 2012). Others blame inappropriate policing strategies; inadequate intelligence gathering, analysis and utilization skills and facilities, inadequacy of officers in various ranks; poor conditions of service; lack of public co-operation; grossly inadequate logistics (especially transportation; telecommunication, arms and ammunition etc.); and lack of motivation by the force and superior officers. Still others argue that the NPF's personnel population of 522, 253 is definitely too minimal to cope with the policing of the estimated population of over 200 million Nigeria spread over a wide range of geographical space. According to 2017 police budget, the 522, 253 population comprises one Inspector General, seven Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), 29 Assistant Inspector General of Police(AIG), 111 Commissioners of Police (CP), 236 Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP), 577 Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), 980 Chief Superintendent of Police (CSP), 2,690 Superintendent of Police (SP), 4,522 Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), 3,044 Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP 1), 10, 287 Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP 11), 49,026 Inspector, 62,681 Sergeant, 128, 656 Corporal, and 19,043 Constable.

Seminars, conferences, panels, and reforms with policy implications have been adopted to address this scenario with no feasible progress or result. There is no time, no proposal, and no policy recommendation or bill sent to the President or the National Assembly to recruit sufficient personnel for NPF. It is also pertinent to observe that these efforts tend to ignore the fact that important roles played by NPF are defined by law, the conception of security as defined by the political and economic interests of the dominant and/or ruling elites, and their political Will. For instance, the entire activities of NPF are subject to the wishes and caprices of the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian armed forces in accord with the 1999 Constitution and the Police Act (Rauch

and Spuy, 2006). Thus, Olong and Agbonika (2013) and Oteh and Alexander (2012) argue that the police have become a tool for the perpetration of electoral malpractice, victimizing political opponents and parties, and an instrument in the hand of the ruling government to frustrate popular democracy. It suffices to say that the funding, activities and failures of NPF should be reviewed from the perspective of the politicisation of the force. Therefore, it seems faulty that in all the stated efforts to tackle NPF's failures, little or no attention has been giving to the nature of police budgeting through which the funds are made available, the character and practice of its oversight function, which defines the efficiency of the appropriated fund, and the existing relationship between the funding, focus police operations, and police inability to satisfy public interests, which is an important indices of good governance. This paper attempts to logically and objectively evaluate these ignored issues with a view to raise salient but pertinent factors that are responsible for NPF failures.

1.1 Materials and methods

This paper adopted archival research wherein available and appropriate research reports and publications in public and private libraries, newspapers and magazines together with available materials in the cyberspace – the internet were consulted. Other sources of data include conference and seminar papers, government publications and gazettes, etc. The method adopted therein is to search for these publications, read and digest their contents, extrapolate their findings and use them as data. Further, content analysis was used to analyse the data generated there from.

1.1.1 Conceptual clarifications

1.1.1.1 Police

The word 'police' is derived from the Greek word 'Polis', which means "that part of non-ecclesiastical administration having to do with the safety, health and order of the state" (Ehinder, 1998: 1). In line with this conception, the Black Law Dictionary (1979) defined it as a unit of armed forces established for the maintenance of law and order. Therefore, police refers to a unit or department of the state that is responsible for public peace, order and tranquillity; enforcement of laws, the promotion of public health, safety and morals; the prevention, detection and prosecution of offenders. According to Alemika and Chukwuma (2006), police refers to a socio-political and quasi-legal institution, a state agency charged primarily with the enforcement of criminal law and the maintenance of order. However, some scholars tend to integrate the existence of non-governmental organisations who are equally involved in the business of community policing. Thus scholars like Aremu (2009) defined the police as public organizations (whether private and public) involved in enforcing enacted laws, whose primary role is to provide security for the city and the people residing in it. For this school of thought, police is an institution or organization (private or public), whose agents are involved in enforcing enacted laws and at the same time ensuring internal protection of life and properties. It is necessary to state without wasting time that in as much as the opinion of this school seems objective, the scope of this paper deals with public or state established police institution.

1.1.1.2 Nigeria police force

The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) emerged from the Colonial pursuit of a national security outfit (Olong and Agbonika 2013). Thus, Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi (2016) noted that the history of NPF is traceable to British annexation of Lagos in 1861 and the consequent establishment of 30 men Lagos Consular Guard to enforce colonial law and order, and to maintain sanitary regulations. The Consular Guard was renamed Hausa Guard in 1863 as a reflection of the ethnic origin of these men that were recruited into the unit. The Hausa Guard was regularized in 1879 by an ordinance creating a constabulary for the Colony of Lagos and known as Hausa Constabulary. However, on January 1, 1896, the colonial administration established and equipped with arms the Lagos Police Force. The declaration of the current South-South states (i.e. Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers states) as oil River Protectorate in 1891 with Headquarters at Calabar led to the creation another armed Constabulary to enforce law and order there (Obaro, 2014). Similar armed Guard known as the Royal Niger Constabulary was created when the British annexed Northern protectorate in 1900. This was later divided into the Northern Nigerian Police and the Northern Nigeria Regiment while the Lagos Police Force and part of the Niger Coast Constabulary collapsed into the Southern Nigeria Regiments. These divisions or regional Police forces were brought together to form the Nigeria Police Force in 1930 with its Headquarters in Lagos. Although the politics of regionalism and ethnicity affected the structure and administration of the formation from 1930, it was stabilised

as a monolithic and centralized Police Force in 1968. The Nigerian Police Force maintains a three-tier administrative structure of departments, zonal and state commands. Accordingly, the Police Act and the Police Regulations regimentally structured the Force with the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) at the apex. The 36 states and Abuja – the Federal capital are grouped into 12 zonal Commands headed by Assistant Inspector-General (AIG) of police as follows:

Table 1: NPF zonal Commands

Zone	States in the zone	Headquarter
Zone 1	Kano, Katsina, and Jigawa States	Kano
Zone 2	Lagos and Ogun States	Lagos
Zone 3	Adamawa, Gombe, and Taraba States	Yola
Zone 4	Benue, Nassarawa, and Plateau States	Makurdi
Zone 5	Bayelsa, Delta, and Edo States	Benin
Zone 6	Cross River, Ebonyi, Rivers, and Akwa Ibom States	Calabar
Zone 7	Federal Capital Territory, Kaduna, and Niger States	Federal Capital Territory
Zone 8	Ekiti, Kogi, and Kwara States	Lokoja
Zone 9	Abia, Anambra, Enugu, and Imo States	Umuahia
Zone 10	Kebbi, Sokoto, and Zamfara States	Sokoto
Zone 11	Ondo, Osun, and Oyo States	Oshogbo
Zone 12	Bauchi, Borno, and Yobe States	Bauchi

Source: Police Diary, 2017

Each of the states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) constitute a Police Command directly under the zone with a Police Commissioner at the helm of affairs. Each of the State Commands is subdivided into Area Commands under the operational control of an Area Commands. The Area Commands are in turn further broken down into Divisional Police Commands headed by Divisional Police Officers (DPOs). Each Divisional Command is further broken down into contiguous police posts/stations¹. Summarily, in addition to police specialized units such as the Border Patrol, Bombs Disposal Squad, Ports Authority Police, and the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), the NPF created 5,515 police stations with more than 5,000 police posts, 1,115 Police Divisions, 123 Area Commands, and 36 State Commands and one Federal Capital Territory Command as at 2008 (Police Regulations, Regulation 34[2]). Administratively, NPF is organised into six departments, namely: A Department: Administration; B Department: Operations (including signals and communications); C Department: Works; D Department: Criminal Investigations; E Department: Training; and F Department: Planning, Research, and Statistics. The B and D Departments are the most significant in the NPF activities because they deal directly with the protection and enforcement of law and order. The B Department is in-charge of threats to public safety and security such as riots, demonstrations, and situations of significant violence. To this Department belongs the Police Mobile Force (PMF) or MOPOL (Mobile Police). Unfortunately, the MOPOL units “are now being used for duties that are irrelevant to their training, including orderlies to VIPs, ‘specie escort,’ [e.g., armoured truck guards] static guard and road block duties.”²

The D Department is responsible for police intelligence and criminal investigations. This Department is divided into the following sections: Administration, Anti-Fraud, the Central Criminal, Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), X-Squad, General Investigation, Special Fraud Unit (SRU), Legal Section, Forensic Science Laboratory, Interpol Liaison, Homicide, Anti-Human Trafficking Unit, Force Intelligence Bureau (FIB), and DCI Kaduna Annex. The centralization of the command and control in the NPF extends to budgetary and fiscal management. The budget and fiscal management unit of NPF is a sub-unit in A Department, which is known as Directorate of Administration. The office of the IGP is solely responsible for this. It is my contention that the concentration of resource management in one person within a monolithic and regimented organization like NPF generates and sustains unaccountable patronage, high level corruption and financial mismanagement, and weakened or poor oversight functions. Serving and past IGPs compliment the list of richest Nigerians. The history

¹A breakdown of the organizational structure of the Nigeria Police Force is available at: www.nigeriapolice.org.

²Main Report of the Presidential Committee on Police Reform, Vol. II (2006), p. 102.

of appropriation and fiscal management in NPF is fraught with misappropriation of funds, diversion of resources meant for police operations before they reach the points of need, operations, and service delivery in the various states (Salami, 2006; Abubakar, 2007; Olusola and Olufowobi, 2007). Consequently, there is absolute lack of essential investigation, patrol, communications, and protection tools and equipment in the operational formations and personnel of NPF (Oyemwinmina and Aibieyi, 2016). According to the Nigeria Police Watch (2011), NPF performs conventional police functions and is responsible for internal security generally; for supporting the Prison, Immigration and Customs Services and for performing Military duties, within or outside Nigeria as directed. This is geared towards the provision of efficient and effective preservation of law and order, protection of citizens from suffering, fear and loss of life and property produced by crime and violent conflict. NPF is, therefore, an institution of social control (Obaro, 2014).

1.1.1.3 Budget

The word budget originated from a French word ‘bougette’, meaning little bag, which the British used to describe the leather bag in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer used to carry to the parliament, the statement of government needs and sources. After several thoughts of consensus, the budget became known as the document contained in the bags which represent plans of government expressed in money and submitted to legislature for approval. As a derivation, Ekhaton and Chima (2015) amplified this further to mean a statement of the probable revenue and expenditure for the ensuing year. Thus, the concept budget refers to any template that determines how to raise, allocate and spend public resources (Overseas Development Institute, 2004). It is one of the most rational and acceptable means through which governments or organisations allocate resources to provide the goods and services needed to improve people’s well-being (Osanyintuyi, 2007). It provides the instrument and basis for resource mobilisation and allocation to strategic areas, institutional priorities, and specific projects in order to achieve corporate objectives (Olomola, 2006). It is the extent to which these objectives are achieved that provides public goods and satisfaction. The basic and essential features of budgeting include forecasting, planning, financing, safeguarding, utilization, monitoring, and reporting (Awe, 2001). Therefore, budgeting deals with institutional issues and policy, reliable data, funding such issues, and monitoring the implementation of the funding process, which begins with raising funds, allocating funds, auditing their use, reporting, and sanctioning deviants where appropriate (NISER, 1977; Alabi, 1987). It is characterised by fiscal discipline and a coherent chain of accountability of its outputs and outcomes. These indices serve to evaluate specific public programmes and institutional performance annually. This paper relies on these indices in its effort to investigate and evaluate the relationship between budgeting, under-funding, and NPF’s inability to provide public good or ensure safety and security of lives and property in Nigeria.

1.1.2 Budget and Funding in the Nigeria Police Force

The NPF has a budget division in the administration and finance department. The Division is responsible for the preparation of its annual Budgets, which always consists of matching vote and availability of funds, estimated capital, and recurrent expenditures such as annual personnel and annual overhead estimates of the institution. The Division is also involved in ensuring that all financial resources are mobilized and effectively managed to meet the needs of the institution in carrying out its obligations. It liaises with or submits its budget proposal to the Budget Office of the Federation, Federal Ministry of Finance who in-turn submits same to the National Assembly for legislation after the Federal Executive Council (FEC) approval. The Division is also responsible for the collection of Warrants/AIE (if any) from the ministry of finance, preparing details of NPF’s annual budget releases/performance to National Assemblies for its oversight functions, monitoring of budget performance and carrying out any other function that may be assigned to them.

Anecdotal evidence as displayed in table 2 below reveals that the annual national appropriation to NPF has continued to rise or increase since the 1980s due to exigencies and institutional request. Therefore, it is subjective and callous for anybody or organisation to accuse the federal government of indifference to police funding. The question should be has the police budget proposal being articulating the precise needs of the 12 zonal and 37 states Commands of the force? That is, is the police budget a product of empirical appraisal of the needs of the force in its units of Command across the nation? Has the appropriated funds been released and if so, were they actually used for the projects they were meant to serve?

Table 2: The Nigeria Police Annual Budget Expressed as a Percentage of the National Budget from the Period 1980–2007

No	Year	Recurrent Expenditure		Capital Expenditure	Police Annual Approved Budget	Federal Government Budget	% of Federal Budget
		Personnel Costs	Overhead Costs				
1	1980	121,971,300	63,415,700	8,508,000	193,895,000	Nil	Nil
2	1981	273,164,450	111,005,060	105,728,060	489,897,570	13,450,000,000	4.0
3	1982	268,107,650	119,181,210	90,792,460	478,081,320	Nil	Nil
4	1983	275,439,430	116,678,520	201,000,000	593,117,950	5,560,937,850	10.7
5	1984	216,157,320	143,723,690	30,400,000	390,280,710	10,008,130,332	3.9
6	1985	231,260,630	150,873,700	19,025,258	401,159,588	11,269,642,320	3.5
7	1986	284,098,880	97,975,450	3,000,000	412,074,330	11,581,732,901	3.6
8	1987	305,768,320	69,768,620	13,461,263	388,979,903	17,517,080,030	2.2
9	1988	406,277,610	114,768,320	60,000,000	581,025,930	24,365,266,325	2.4
10	1989	529,257,610	114,768,320	100,000,000	744,025,930	30,031,718,890	2.5
11	1990	924,865,570	17,000,000	149,000,000	1,243,865,570	39,763,988,955	3.1
12	1991	1,223,912,300	197,107,230	330,339,000	1,751,358,530	38,665,978,779	4.5
13	1992	1,396,830,900	236,564,230	560,000,000	2,193,395,130	52,035,943,482	4.2
14	1993	2,173,419,140	502,512,230	893,000,000	3,568,922,370	110,591,994,300	3.2
15	1994	3,550,000,000	749,677,150	1,370,000,000	5,669,677,150	110,200,000,000	5.1
16	1995	3,993,750,000	999,612,580	1,400,000,000	6,393,362,580	98,201,184,130	6.5
17	1996	7,538,120,650	1,174,612,580	1,079,284,500	9,792,017,730	174,000,000,000	5.6
18	1997	7,538,120,650	2,206,311,500	2,565,639,000	12,310,071,150	247,000,000,000	4.9
19	1998	10,456,626,761	3,828,744,420	3,353,690,450	17,639,061,631	260,000,000,000	6.8
20	1999	16,187,875,711	3,427,040,152	3,000,000,000	22,614,915,863	299,000,000,000	7.6
21	2000	20,594,810,050	4,711,831,940	4,641,000,000	22,795,607,650	710,580,800,000	3.4
22	2001	32,187,169,739.33	4,925,434,778	7,884,999,72	44,997,604,240	894,200,000,000	5.03
23	2002	34,448,000,000.00	15,020,266,983	3,595,387,000	53,063,653,983	1,612,801,253,520	3.3
24	2003	46,491,347,624.00	9,777,753,891	11,366,000,000	67,635,101,515	1,679,318,043,375	4.03
25	2004	59,407,514,242.00	4,368,691,376	10,000,000,000	73,776,205,618	2,035,648,344,588	3.6
26	2005	62,500,276,263.00	8,334,767,941	14,500,000,000	85,335,044,204	1,617,629,111,162	5.3
27	2006	73,426,675,062.00	7,221,326,938	5,335,000,000	85,983,002,000	1,899,987,922,467	4.5
28	2007	156,930,961,726.00	11,698,452,627	9,975,790,725	178,605,205,07	2,309,223,949,983	7.7

8

Source: Budget and National Planning, 2008.

Most of the critics at the vanguard of campaign against perceived police under-funding argue that the percentage of security or police annual appropriation to the entire national budget is smaller than their counterparts in other countries of the world including Africa. The N560 billion annual budget recommendation made by the 2008 Presidential Committee on Police Reform headed by M.D Yusuf on this basis was not tied to specific projects or reliable data and as such does not conform to budgetary principles. I disagree with this school of thought because they ignore the fact that appropriation is based on institutional proposal and clarity of demands, and not on percentage fixture. The case of under-funding can only be proved if the Federal Executive Council and the National Assembly substantially and subjectively reject or cut down or reduce police budgetary proposal. If what they request for is granted, they are not under-funded. This suffices to argue that NPF does not practice conventional budget principles. They practice top-down budgetary process wherein the Office of the IGP decides what to allocate to all units of Commands annually instead of these Commands articulating what they want and accessing the funds approved for them when they released. To buttress this point, the Federal House of Representatives Committee on Police Affairs chaired by Hon Haliru Dauda Jika reject and returned the 2018 police budget proposals presented to it by the leadership of the NPF as thoroughly inadequate and grossly incapable of mitigating the hydra-headed security situation in the country.

In some other cases, the National Assembly reduces police budget proposal because the IGP or the leadership of the NPF fails to substantiate police request in the budget. For instance, in the N332 Billion 2018 budget proposal, only about 10 per cent of the budget covers overhead and capital costs while the remaining 90 per cent is specifically for personnel costs for the Service. Yet members of the force are complaining and protesting publicly against none and poor payment of their salaries/allowances. If such requests emanated from the units, there must

be specific needs they address and will not be rejected. Therefore, NPF budgeting practice does not comply with the conventional principles of forecasting, planning, and utilisation of reliable data in pursuit of institutional issues and policies. However, I must admit that the politicisation of NPF and its activities, unconventional approach to budgeting, and NPF indifference to its conventional duties tend to affect its annual appropriation negatively since 2011. Its leadership crew finds it difficult to substantiate and defend its budget proposals, while individuals and groups being hunted by the police under executive instructions undermine their proposals. These lead to high level disparity between their proposals and the approvals received. Table 3 below reveals the disparity between what is proposed, approved and released for NPF operations from 2012 to 2016.

Table 3: NPF Budgetary Allocation and Fund Release, 2012 - 2016

Year	Budget Proposal		Budget Approved		Amount Released	
	Capital (N)	Overhead (N)	Capital (N)	Overhead (N)	Capital (N)	Overhead (N)
2012	49,986,488,369	52,380,215,760	9,656,295,375	8,103,952,375	7,035,558,743	8,103,952,375
2013	218,831,118,588	56,693,843,764	14,096,000,000	7,683,952,375	11,061,463,428	7,683,952,375
2014	218,831,118,588	56,693,843,764	7,340,000,000	8,499,861,314	3,453,492,502	5,228,679,520
2015	345,756,469,886	71,894,140,124	17,800,000,000	5,895,797,734	8,900,000,000	4,838,790,846
2016	331,000,000,000	90,645,426,172	16,107,272,000	9,250,565,307	10,026,818,000	6,369,343,519.18

Source: Idris, 2017

The NPF appropriation experiences recorded in table 3 above replicated itself in 2017. Out of the Force budget proposal of N342 billion for capital expenses in 2017, only N20.19 billion was appropriated. Of this appropriated sum, only N9.09 billion, representing 45 per cent of the appropriation was released. Similarly, the sum of N11.6 billion was appropriated as overhead cost but N5.9 billion only, which represents 51 per cent of the appropriated sum, was released. The observed unimaginable disparity in what the police want and what they are given is necessitated by three factors, namely: the subject nature of the budget, politics and lack of political Will on the part of government, and corruption fuel by lack of accountability or oversight functions. Nevertheless, there are other empirical evidences to prove that the Nigerian Police Force is not under-funded. In addition to the national annual appropriation, all the state governors and the Minister for Federal Capital territory make substantive allocation of their unaccountable security votes to the respective zonal and state Commands of the force. Vehicles and other utility vehicles such as armoured personnel carriers, arms and ammunitions are being provided by these governors on annual basis. There are many philanthropic donations such as cash, vehicles, renovation and construction of residential and office complexes for the force by entrepreneurs and elites that benefit from police services. To mention banks, Dangote groups, Peace Mass Transit Limited is only a disservice to others who regularly engage in such donations. It is therefore my contention that any failure of the NPF to discharge its responsibilities should not be attributed to under-funding. Similarly, the Nigeria Police Trust Fund was established to raise additional and adequate fund for the Force, which complements other sources of funding for effective and efficient discharging of their responsibilities.

1.1.3 Budget, funding, and NPF pro-public good policy

The conventional policy, which NPF operations tend to implement, is to prevent and detect crimes, apprehend offenders, preserve law and order, protect life and property, and enforce all laws and regulations (FRN Police Act 1990: Section 4). For these, NPF budgetary proposals were funded. Thus, the problem of under-funding, even if it exists, is expected or ought to impact on the degree of policy actualisation negatively but not to change policy direction. It cannot be a reason for NPF anti-people's activities or policy.

For instance, the Force adoption or use of severe torture, rape and carnal knowledge of suspects, violence, inhuman treatment, and extra-judicial killing as preferred alternative in their bids to combat crime and criminality (Human Rights Watch, 2010) cannot be linked to under-funding and this is anti-public good. Personnel of the NPF carry out these activities outside the bounds of known permissible laws with the slogan 'bloody civilian'. Although one may be tempted to argue that the prevailing corruption and extortion in the Force were caused by their poor working condition particularly with regards to wage and salary, the recent increases in their salaries and allowances nullify this position as such illegal acts persist. Members of the Force lack the political Will for reform and are

prone to threaten and demand bribes from Nigerians than enforce laws. These reinforce public perception of NPF as an ineffective, abusive and corrupt institution (Open Society Institute and NOPRIN, 2010).

Detainees in the police cells or custody are faced with beatings with metal rods, sticks, planks, and horsewhip (koboko). Some of them experience the tying of arms and legs tight behind the body, spraying of tear gas on the face of victims, electric shock, the use of death threats, shooting of victims in the leg or Foot, and other acts meant to inflict maximum pains (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2000; Amnesty International, 2017; Human Rights Watch, 2010). The perpetrators of these brutality and abuses often go unpunished thereby consolidating the culture of violence and insecurity among Nigerians. Are these victims responsible for the perceived under-funding of NPF or what relationship has this with budgeting? In some cases, these torture and abuse of police detainees and suspects led to death in custody. In such instances, the police embark of cover-up lies and attribute such deaths to bungled attempts by suspects to escape, and there from attract public sympathy that neutralise the pressure to probe such incidents (Human Rights Watch, 2010, 2005; Amnesty International, 2002, 2003). Example of such cases, which unfortunately for the Police failed to attract such sympathy, include the killing of two secondary school boys in Nsukka Divisional Police Command, Enugu state March 10, 2002 and the killing of six traders at the Apo area of Abuja, the nation's Federal Capital city between 7 and 8 June, 2005. Many of such cases abound across the country.

Similarly, it is my contention that poor funding call for efficient and prudent management of resources and not corruption, which undermines all projects and daily operations of the Nigerian Police Force. The Force acquired sustained notoriety for corruption and mismanagement – factors identified to have militated against the actualisation of police corporate and conventional objectives. According to Ivkovic (2003), corruption is synonymous with police formation across the world. A serving Nigerian Inspector General, IGP Tafa Balogun, was arrested, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment by a Federal High Court during President Olusegun Obasanjo's regime for corruption (Ivkovic (2003) Ajayi, 2005). Extortion of motorist at illegally mounted checking points, material gratification to pervert justice, extortion of persons arrested on frivolous charges, leasing of arms and ammunitions to criminals, and other sharp practices are the current face of NPF (Onyeozili, 2005). The Force is a terror to the public, which it is established to protect. The report of the 2008 Presidential Commission on Police Reform succinctly observed this in the following words, 'instead of the police been seen as a public asset, the force has become public burden' (FRN, 2008: 196). This informs the perception held by most Nigerians that NPF has largely failed to live up to its responsibilities (Akinlabi, 2017; Agbibo, 2015; Alemika, 2010), and this cannot be a consequence of low appropriation and under-funding. There is no relationship between NPF funding and the prevailing corrupt practices in the institution.

The conception of security in Nigeria tends to exacerbate the scenario. In Nigeria national security means state security, which in-turn means the security of political office holders (Ibeanuand Momoh, 2008). Thus, instead of ensuring public safety and security, NPF and other security forces are concerned with protecting the political elites and the rich by using state violence against other sections of the population (Pearce, McGee, and Wheeler, 2011). Howe (2001:14) admitted that the character and operations or activities of the security forces reflect the "national political structures and values", which are created by the elites. This explains why NPF sent over 40,000 police personnel to conduct election in Ekiti state alone but could not send 5,000 to stop genocidal killings in Benue state. Similarly, the best trained, better equipped, and greater numbers of military and police personnel are drafted to guard and escort the ruling political elites and the rich, many others sent to road blocks to extort money from the public, leaving lesser and poorly armed number of personnel in the stations for public safety. This, which explains police failure in its public responsibilities and the prevailing rise in crimes and insecurity in Nigeria, has no relationship with budgeting and under-funding. It is fallacious, therefore, to attribute NPF failures primarily to lack of fund and poor annual appropriation.

Similarly, police are the principal violators of the law, people's fundamental human rights, and are in league with anti-social elements; indulging in selective enforcement of the law depending on the socio-cultural status, economic power and political influences of people involved; manifest a dismal record of prevention and successful investigation of crimes, poor oversight functions and lack of accountability, can never translate into financial handicap. Therefore, in the language of Yusuf Police Panel, "The negative image of the police in the eyes and minds of the public arose from the high level of crimes in the force and its failure to carry out genuine police functions successfully" (FRN, 2008, p. 196). The panel further stated, "instead of becoming a public asset therefore,

the police have become a public burden” (FRN, 2008, p. 33). Yet Nigeria spends an average of N300 billion (approximately \$1billion) annually in addition to state governments and philanthropic donations to maintain a failed police force. For instance, available records show that NPF received N321.3 billion as its 2015 budget allocation out of which N303 billion went to its recurrent expenditures alone. In 2016 and 2017, N283 billion and N482.3 were respectively appropriated. Virtually, all the sums were allocated to recurrent expenditures, which possess enormous window for embezzlement and mismanagement.

2. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Nigerian Police Force was established to provide safety and security of lives and property. Through enabling laws and processes, funds are appropriated annually to enable them discharge their duties and responsibilities. In addition, to many philanthropic donations, the 36 state governors and the Minister of federal capital territory, Abuja make provisions for the smooth operations of their respective NPF Commands. Yet, NPF has failed in its responsibilities. The country is ridden with all forms of criminality such as armed robbery, kidnapping, assassinations, rape, ritual murder, socio-religious violence, terrorist activities, insurgencies and separatist agitations among others. The police through its activities and operations became Nigerian’s greatest nightmare and enemy. Stories and records of extra-judicial killings, harassment, and violation of people’s human rights, extortion, illegal arrests, torture, and murder are rampant. The force has even abdicated its public roles for individual and private safety and security operations in the form of providing security to political office holders and the rich in the society. The entire force is ridden with corruption. Yet, the leadership of NPF and their cohorts tend to blame poor appropriation and under-funding for their failure.

However, after analysing records, previous inquiries and publications this paper observes that there is no relationship between the level of NPF annual appropriation and the abysmal failure of the force to provide public safety and security, maintain and enforce law and order. Four principal factors can be blamed. First, the Nigerian Police does not practice conventional budgetary principles, which would have factored in their justifiable units’ needs. Thus, they spend their funds arbitrarily and on things that satisfy the interests of the force elites. Secondly, the politicisation and use of the force by dominant ruling elites (socio-economic and political) in pursuit of clandestine and partisan interests has negative impact on the image of the force and the approval of their budget proposals. Thirdly, NPF abandoned its conventional responsibilities for private and individual policing wherein the safety and protection of the elites becomes paramount to the neglect of the public. Finally, the unambiguous pursuit of individual economic interest of members of the force engendered corruption, repression and abuse in their operations and turned members of the public into preys.

2.1 Recommendations

This paper, therefore, recommends the followings: The Nigerian Police Force should as a matter of urgency adopt international budgeting best practices, establish budget and planning department in all its units across the federation, and thereafter organise compulsory and sponsored budget seminars/workshops for them. Secondly, the control and management of NPF should be withdrawn from the President and transferred to the National Assembly in order to entrench sanity and objectivity into the Force. This will de-politicise the institution. Thirdly, the IGP should establish an anti-abuse and ethics department with sole responsibility of sanitising the police force. Special professionals such as lawyers, psychologists, criminologists, economists and auditors should be drafted and/or recruited into the unit and empowered to deal with the rank and file that violate police ethics, security conventions, rule of law, human rights, and corruption. The current IGP X- Squad can be up-graded or reformed to perform this duty.

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