ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN NIGERIA: A REVIEW OF 2011 POST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VIOLENCE IN KATSINA STATE

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Abstract

Over the years, elections in Nigeria are marred by electoral violence, either before, during or after the elections. Right from the first republic to fourth republic started in 1999, none of the elections has been successfully conducted without any incidence of electoral violence, which always affects the electoral integrity and democratization process of the country. The 2011 presidential election was not only counted among the fairest election, but also recorded as the most violent election ever conducted in the democratic history of the country. Therefore, this paper is determined to identify the factors responsible and consequences of 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state, and to further assess its effects on the democratization process in Nigeria using game theory as its theoretical foundation. The data generated from both primary and secondary sources revealed that, electoral malpractices and religious sentiments are the core factors responsible for 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state, which many people lost their lives, displaced and millions of properties were destroyed, to the extent that, many people prepare military regime than the democratic atmosphere of the country. The paper concludes that these and many other factors must to be properly and decisively cure off, thereby recommended that both federal and state governments must act fairly to identify and prosecute those who took part or aided the 2011 post presidential election violence irrespective of their party affiliations to prevent the future electoral violence in the state and country as a whole.

Keywords: Election, Election violence, Democracy, Democratization, Katsina and Nigeria.

Introduction

In every democracy, election is the essential ingredient that allows for peaceful transition from one regime to another. It is the means and process by which the electorate decided who and which group administers the affairs of the country. But, in many emerging democracies or transitional societies of Africa, election have often been conducted in such a way as to give, but a poor reflection of the popular will which have often been leading to violence (Adele, 2012: 7). Electoral violence therefore, has been one of fundamental and common attribute of democratization process in many African countries. As argued by Richard (1997: 3) that of the
many factors impeding the democratization processes in Africa, none appears more significant than the upsurge of electoral violence. Hence, Nigeria is not been an exception, electoral violence has always characterized the nature and pattern of its democratization processes right from the colonial period. After the independence, Nigeria became more exposed to diverse electoral violence in her democratization processes. As matter of fact, electoral violence became a vehicle used by politicians to transport them from one position to another or to maintain their existing political power structure in the country.

Therefore, it was not surprised that the 2011 presidential election was not only counted among the fairest election, but also the most violent one ever conducted in the democratic history of the country that spark across most of the Northern States including; Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Bauchi, Gomde, Niger, Sokoto, Zamfara, Taraba among others. Even though, Katsina state has a relatively minimal history of violence, but been it as a home state of the former Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) flag bearer, Gen, Mohammadu Buhari, who had been perceived as the major opposition from the North during 2011 presidential election, makes the state to be one among the hotspot of the 2011 post presidential election violence in Nigeria.

It is against this background that this paper determines to examine the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state through the following specific objectives;

i. To identify the factors responsible for the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state.

ii. To find out the consequences of 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state.

iii. To also assess the effects of 2011 post presidential election violence on the democratization process in Nigeria.

To achieve this effort, the paper is divided into the following sections after the introduction, then conceptualization, theoretical frame work, methodology, major historical antecedences of electoral violence in Nigeria, factors responsible for the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state, the consequences of 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state, the effects of 2011 post presidential electoral violence on the democratization process in Nigeria, conclusion and recommendation.

Conceptualization

Election

According to Orji & Uzodi (2011: 6) Election involve a set of activities leading to the selection of one or more persons out of many to serve in positions of authority in a society. Meaning that, any activity or set of activities that makes person or group of persons to occupied authoritative position in an organized society can be called election. In its proper sense, election is a process of selecting the officers or representatives of an organization or group by the vote of its qualified members (Nwolise, 2007: 155). Three major elements can be deduct from the above definition as follows; election as a process, selecting representatives and qualified electorates.

In other words, election was also conceptualized as the process of elite selection by the masses of the population in any given political system (Anifowose, 2003: 21). In the same manner, Iyayi (2005: 1) noted that, election is the medium by which the different interest groups within the bourgeois nation state can stake and resolve their claims to power through peaceful means. This definition indicated that election is a means through which political conflict can be resolved peacefully among different groups within modern transitional societies. But, however, it has also been argued that, in the transitional societies, elections have often been conducted in such a way as to give but a poor reflection of the popular will which have often been leading to violence (Adele, 2012: 7).
**Election Violence**

On the other hand, Fisher (2002: 8) conceptualized electoral violence as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threats, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination. Meaning that, the target of electoral violence can be people, place, data, or things. Therefore, in an attempt to influence the electoral process, perpetrators of electoral violence may attempt to delay, disrupt or derail a poll and determine the winners of competitive races for political office (UNDP, 2009: 4).

Osimen (2012) stated that, electoral violence involves destruction of property with a view to inflicting emotional or psychological injury and economic loss on another person. Electoral violence refers to the use or threat of force against an opponent within the context of electoral competition for state power. Acts of electoral violence include murder, arson, abduction, assault, rioting, violence seizure, destruction of electoral materials and psychological intimidation (Alemeika, 2011: 9). Electoral violence is also defined as all forms of organized acts or threats, physical, psychological, and structural aimed at intimidating, harming, or blackmailing a political stakeholders before, during and after an election with a view of determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process (Albert, 2007: 133).

However, the major characteristics of the above definitions can be categorized into physical and non-physical forms. The physical forms include: kidnapping, killing, riot, burning, protest and destruction of property. While the non-physical forms are: threats, intimidation, blackmail, and emotional or psychological injury (JTF on Electoral Assistance, 2011: 15). Furthermore, the main goal of electoral violence is to influence the electoral process, either by changing the outcome of election, or by disrupting the electoral process. Electoral violence can occur at different stages in the election cycle that is before, during or after election. Therefore, what distinguishes post-election violence from other forms of electoral violence is the fact that, it occurs just after polling, usually during or after collation and announcement of election result.

**Democratization**

Democratization according to Ghali (1999: 1) is a process which leads to a more open, more participatory, less authoritarian society. In other words, it is a gradual process of political growth often synonymous to emerging democracies that needs to imbibe and attain genuine democratic ideals and values necessary for building enduring democratic system. Therefore, democratization is simply refers to conscious, deliberate and committed attempt at entrenching enduring democratic values and ideas in political actors and the entire citizenry with a view to ensuring the continuity and sustainability of the democratic system (Jude & Gambo, 2013: 5).

Democratization can also be seen as a process of political change that moves the political system of any given society towards a system of government that ensures peaceful competitive political participation in an environment that guarantees political and civil liberties (Samarasinghe, 1994: 14). However, to better understand the concept of democratization as a process Stepan (1999) in Rakner, Menocal and Fritz (2007: 7) sub-divided it into three phases as follows:

*The first phase is the liberalization phase, when the previous authoritarian regime opens up or crumbles. The second phase is the transition phase, often culminating when the first competitive elections are held, and the third phase is the consolidation phase, when democratic practices are expected to become more firmly established and accepted by most relevant actors.*

It was based on this assertion many scholars argued that at least 20 years of democratic experience may be required for an egalitarian effect to be noticeable.
Theoretical frame work
This paper is anchored within the theoretical submissions developed by the game theory. As a matter of fact, there are other theories that can guide the study of this nature like: group conflict theory, frustration aggression theory, from individual to societal aggression model and so on. But, the major reason behind the adoption of this theory in explaining and analyzing the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state can be justify by the nature of electoral contestation of Nigerian politics. The two main aspects of the theory namely; the zero sum games and the non zero sum games offered a clear picture and adequately captured the purposes of this study, especially the aspect of zero sum games. This aspect assume that, there are two or more players involved in the game i.e. Mr. A and Mr. B, with the ultimate goal of winning the game, through prescribed rules and strategies associated with the game. The rules include; there could be only one winner, each player is on his own, there shall be no coalition between players and no compensations for losers. In such a situation, each player would seek to play according to the rules, but no matter what, there can be only one winner, who takes the entire prize at stake (Kehinde, 2007: 100). Meaning that what A wins, B loses (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1990: 508). As matter of fact, the frustrations of the prospective losers may cause them to adopt other strategies that are alien to the rules of the game. Thus, violence becomes inevitable. Furthermore, as the outcome would favor only one player, the other players that are excluded from the prize of the game may turn to violence as the only alternative i.e. the case of 2011 presidential election in Nigeria, for either to prevent the winner from enjoying the benefit of the prize and allow for negotiations, or to press for some form of redress, including the setting up of power sharing arrangement i.e. the case of Kenya. Or even the winner may adopt violence as a tool to suppress or even eliminate the oppositions, as it happened in Zimbabwe. Therefore, the nature of political contestations in Nigerian politics and Africa generally, adopted the aspect of zero sum game theory, particularly the countries that adhere to the presidential system of government, where the winner win all at stake and leaves nothing for the losers. Generally, the deprivation and frustration emanating from the losers after the declaration of the winner generated a lot tension, conflict and violence. The presidential system of government adopted in 1979 and 1999 constitution in the second and fourth republic to date, does not make any room for the losers to have certain degree of prize in the election, even if the proportion of votes gained by winner in the election do not translate into overwhelming support of the majority. Thus affecting the legitimacy of the winner, that always degenerated into a serious post electoral violence. Meaning that the enormous gain by the winner and the total exclusion of the losers, are usually reduced to matters between life and death (Kehinde, 2007; 101). It was from this view point, the former president Olusegun Obasanjo in 2007 apparently stated that the 2007 election is a do or die affairs.

Methodology
The paper adopted both primary and secondary data. The primary data were generated through a field survey. A total of 300 hundred questionnaires were constructed and administered as appropriate survey instrument, out of which 226 were successfully retrieved from the three local governments that were randomly selected from three senatorial zones for the study, namely; Katsina, Funtua and Daura local governments. The selection was intentionally because, these local governments were the most affected areas during 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state. The respondents or categories of people target by the questionnaire in each local government are; gang or group of youths, victims of the violence, security agents i.e. police, health workers, politicians and some residents. The data obtained through both open and close ended
questionnaires were interpreted, analyzed and presented using descriptive statistics analytical tools which include; simple ratio percentages, tables and graphs. On the other hand, the secondary data were gathered from textbooks, academic journals, articles, reports, and newspapers. Therefore, the study is both quantitative and qualitative in nature.

**Major historical antecedences of electoral violence in Nigeria**

Elections in Nigeria can be generally classified into two, the transitional elections and consolidation elections. The transitional elections are; 1954, 1959, 1979, 1993 and 1999 elections. While the consolidation elections include; 1964/65, 1983, 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections. The transitional elections are the general elections organized by a departing political authority, which include those organised by the colonial authorities and military regimes. While, consolidation elections are the general elections organised by a civilian regimes and are intended towards consolidating civil rule. Therefore, based on the existing literatures, transitional elections are relatively more peaceful than consolidation elections. Thus, the paper would strictly look into consolidation elections of 1964/65, 1983, 2003, 2007 and 2011 electoral violence in Nigeria briefly.

**The 1964/65 federal and western regional elections**

The Nigeria’s first post-independence government led by Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, organised general election and regional elections in 1964 and 1965 respectively. The poll returned the government to a second term in office (Oseghe, 1998: 31). The 1964 federal election was contested by the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), a coalition of NCNC and AG with predominantly southern appeal, and the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA), an alliance between NPC and NNDP, with support mostly from Northern Nigeria. The NPC and its allies in the NNA took advantage of their control of the federal government to manipulate and gain victory in the 1964 federal elections (Anifowose, 1982: 240). However, as envisaged by many people including the proclaimed winners of the 1964 general elections, the results was not only rejected, but the opposition especially in the western region resorted to violence to contest what they perceived as the reverse of their mandate by the ruling NPC. The situation gave birth to arson, looting, killings, massive destruction of properties and total breakdown of law and order beyond the control of the central government. Consequently, a state of emergency was imposed and the then prime minister declared the western region as wild-west (Dudly, 1982 in Patrick & Eikojonwa, 2012; 45). On the other hand, the 1965 western regional election which came soon after the 1964 federal election presented an opportunity for UPGA to demonstrate its popularity and to curtail attempts by the NNA to control the western region through the NNDP. The 1965 election was a regional election, but it had far reaching implications for federal politics. Therefore, both the NNDP and the AG desperately wanted to win the election by all means. It was in the context of this contest between them that the electoral violence of 1965 occurred that led to the death of 153 persons, including 64 persons killed by the police, but observers put the number of casualty at over 2,000 death with many more seriously injured and destruction of properties (Anifowose, 1982: 221; Orji & Uzodi, 2011; 19). It was this insecurity associated with the 1964 electoral violence and the western region election in 1965 that led to first military coup and intervention in Nigeria’s politics on 15 January, 1966.

**The 1983 general elections**

In the second republic, the culture of election malpractices and post election violence with their concomitant effect on democratization process in the country also persisted. The 1979 general elections were widely accepted to have posed undistinguished threat to national security, particularly due to contended issue of 2/3 of 19 states which was resolved by the Supreme Court in favour of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) presidential candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagari.
(Patrick & Eikojonwa, 2012: 46). However, it was observed that the relative calmness experienced during this period was due to the elections were conducted under the supervision of military regime of General Olusegun Obasanjo who was committed to the transitional programmes to civil rule (Emeka, 2012: 1).

Consequently, the violence that occurred during and after the 1983 general elections were similar in magnitude to the 1965 electoral violence. The NPN which won the presidency and gubernatorial elections in seven out of the nineteen states in 1979 wanted to extend its political power throughout the federation. Therefore, the quest for vote pushed the NPN to rig the 1983 elections in a grand scale (Orji & Uzodi, 2011: 20). Alemika (2011) observed that these brazen manipulation of the elections witnessed massive post election violence that led to many lost of lives and properties, particularly following the declared land slide victory of the NPN in old Anambra, Oyo and Ondo states which considered being strong hold of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN). According to Guardian, 1983 cited in Orji & Uzodi (2011; 21) noted that:

> Among the people that lost their lives in Ondo state, especially NPN officials and key allies of Chief Omoboriowo, were the then majority leader of Ondo State House of Assembly, Hon. Tunde Agunbiade, his wife, two children, a driver and five other people as well as Hon Olaiyafag Bamigbe, a member of the National Assembly and secretary of NPN in Ondo state, who was burnt along with ten members of his household. When the protest had calmed down, over 300 houses, including the office of FEDECO in Akure were destroyed.

More often than not, the result of these massive killings was loss of confidence on the newly elected NPN government for the second term. Thus, the second republic was overthrown by the military regime of General Muhammadu Buhari on 31 December, 1983.

**The 2003 general elections**

Democratic rule was restored in 1999 following the conclusion of the transitional elections supervised by military government under General Abdussalam Abubakar, which brought the former president Olusegun Obasanjo to power as the first elected president in the fourth republic. Therefore, the 2003 general elections were the first organized by the civilian regime after the rebirth of democratic rule in 1999 (Animashan, 2010: 8). The 2003 presidential election was contested by then incumbent president Olusegun Obasanjo as People’s Democratic Party (PDP) presidential aspirant and

However, the elections at both federal and state levels were marred by serious incidents of violence, which left scores dead and many others injured. Between April and May, 2003, at least one hundred people were killed and many more injured, majority of serious abuses were perpetrated by members or supporters of the ruling party (PDP) (HRW, 2004: 1). To that extent, Jibrin (2007: 8) discovered that:

> The sub-station of the Federal Radio Corporation in Makurdi (Benue state) was burnt down. At Oji River in Enugu state, Office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was also burnt down following the violent protest on alleged falsification of election results. In the Niger Delta region, elections aggravated the political crisis, in fact during the 2003 elections the level of violence there was the highest in the country. Politicians recruited and armed members of youth groups to intimidate opposition politicians and their supporters.

It was observed generally that the desperation to capture power at the federal and state levels by members of the political class intensely heated up the political process cross the country. The political office holders utilized the power of incumbency to intimidate opposition right from the pre-election campaigns. For instance, prominent political figures such as Chief Bola Ige, Henry Marshall, Victor Nwankwo and Chief Dikibo were assassinated (Oddih, 2007). All these
developments stirred up the allegations that Nigerian government was doing little to prevent widespread of political violence for the success of democratization process in the country.

The 2007 general elections
The 2007 elections, in a profound manner, deepened electoral crisis in Nigeria. As a matter of fact the history has it in records that the elections had attracted large number of post election violence and litigations across the country. Animashaun (2010: 8) point out that the official results of 2007 elections were contested at three level of governance, local, state and federal level. Therefore, the election violence that accompanied the 2007 general elections were characterized by the rampant used of thugs by politicians from both ruling and opposition parties which had created a significant degree of fear and threat as well as discouraged many eligible voters from coming out to vote during the elections, thereby recorded a very low voter turnout cross the country. For instance, in an interviewed conducted by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2007 prior to the elections many voters said;

“We intended to stay at home, rather than cast our voters”, others simply stated that “I don’t want to die”. One retiree in the town of Oye Ekiti said “the elderly people are scared and so are the women, they go a step further by instructing their children, please keep away from that polling booth, I don’t want you to die now”. Again, in the four states monitored by (HRW) during the elections witnessed gangs roaming the streets, attacking and intimidating voters. In Katsina, Gombe and River states, groups of thugs launched attacks on polling stations chasing off voters and carting away ballot boxes and ballot papers. To that extent, an estimated minimum of 300 Nigerians were killed in the pervasive violence associated to the 2007 elections.

The 2011 general elections
Unlike the previous elections which were characterized by massive fraud and flaws, the 2011 elections were regarded by many local and international observers as largely credible and well organized. But, despite the marked improvement in the conduct of the elections, the process was not free from violence. According to Oriji & Uzodi, (2011: 8) the post election violence robbed the shine off the electoral success, even though violence has been part and parcel of electoral contest in Nigeria’s democratization process for long, but the 2011 post election violence stands out in terms of its magnitude, severity and consequences.

The major contestants of the 2011 presidential election were the then incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan as the ruling party candidate, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) who is a southerner, and the Former Head of State Gen. Muhammadu Buhari who is a Northerner as well as flag bearer of defunct Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). The announcement of the presidential election results, which confirmed the victory of President Jonathan, witnessed an unprecedented violence that sparks across many states in the Northern part of the country, such as Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara, Niger, Bauchi, Gombe, Barno, Yobe, Taraba among others (Halliru, 2012; 89).

Protesters burnt places of religious worship, public buildings and the houses of politicians from the ruling party, and religious leaders considered to be related to the party, targeted INEC buildings and its personnel including the NYSC members that served as INEC ad-hoe staff (EU EOM, 2011, 3). Within just four days, Human Rights Watch recorded about 800 people killed and over 65,000 people were found to be temporarily internally displaced. In the southern part of Kaduna state alone over 500 people were killed. In Bauchi state about ten INEC ad-hoe staff were killed who served as members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) (HRW, 2011). These scenario convinced Orji & Uzodi (2011: 28) to argued that the outbreak of 2011 post election violence in the North can be seen as an expression of frustration at electoral defeat by some CPC supporters,
accompanied by grievances relates to the fact that the winner take all in Nigerian politics, which ensured that losers have no access to the state resources. However, it was also noted that the participants in the violence were mostly group of people commonly referred to as thugs. Because, according to Liman (2011: 7) thugs were behind the post election violence that occurred in Kaduna, Adamawa, Bauchi and Niger states. Again, the then commissioner of police in Katsina State Command, Ibrahim Mohammed, blamed the 2011 post election violence in the state on people who refers to as miscreants, arsonists, criminals and murderers. Moreover, an interesting dimension of the violence was attacked on Zaria Central Prison in Kaduna state and Federal Prison in Malumfashi, Katsina state with the released of 164 and 45 inmates by the protesters respectively (Lartey, 2011; 7).

**Factors responsible for the 2011 post presidential election violence in katsina state**

In determining the factors responsible for the 2011 post presidential election violence in katsina state, the following question was asked: what do you think are the factors responsible for the 2011 post presidential election violence in katsina state? The graph (1) below provided the percentages of the respondents during the field survey in katsina state.

![Graph 1](attachment:graph1.png)


Out of the 226 respondents, 211 representing 93% of the respondents believed that, electoral malpractice was one of the major factors responsible for the outbreak of 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state. Only 16 representing 7% of the respondents that do not attempted the question. In the same manner, graph (2) below provided the percentages of the respondents from the religious perspective.

![Graph 2](attachment:graph2.png)

The graph shows that 157 representing 69% of the respondents believed that religious sentiment represented another major factor responsible for the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state. Only 69 representing 31% of the respondents think otherwise. Therefore, electoral malpractices and religious sentiments represented the core causes of the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state.

Although, there were many factors responsible for the violence, but not as strong as the two major ones mentioned above. For instance, out of 226 respondents, 105 representing 46% of the respondents noted that, Regional differences was among the causes of the violence. Furthermore, 89 representing 39% of the respondents argued that the misappropriation of discourse by media also instigated violence during the 2011 presidential election in Katsina state. Other factors include; unemployment 31%, PDP controversy over zoning arrangement 29%, utterances of politicians 24%, and ethnicity 23% of the respondents conceived that they were all among the causes of the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state. The graph (3) below provided a picture of the percentages.

**Consequences of 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state**

In order to identify the effects or consequences of 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state, these questions were asked; Are you aware of the destruction of properties during the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state? Is there anyone that was wounded or injured as a result of the violence? Is there anyone who lost his/her life during the violence? And lastly, is there anyone who was displaced as a result of the violence? The graph (4) below supplied the percentages of the respondents’ accordingly.
The graph above provided the percentages of respondents on the destruction of properties, those that were injured, lost their lives and displaced as a result of the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state. For instance, the first category in the graph shows that out of 226, 177 representing 78% of the respondents were aware of the destruction of properties during the violence. 36 representing 16% of the respondents were not aware of the violence, while 13 representing 6% of the respondents left the answer space blank. In the second category, 179 representing 79% of the respondents noted that many people were injured and wounded as a result of the violence. Only 31 representing 14% of the respondents were not aware and 16 representing 7% of the respondents were undecided. In the third category, 157 representing 69% of the respondents indicated “YES” meaning that they have information about those who lost their lives during the violence. 54 representing 24% of the respondents said “NO” meaning that they were not aware of those who lost their lives, while 15 representing 7% of the respondents were also undecided. In the fourth category, 155 representing 68% of the respondents agreed that “YES” people were displaced during the violence, 49 representing 22% of the respondents answered “NO”, while 22 representing 10% of the respondents do not attempted the question. Although, majority of the respondents believed that “YES” there was destruction of properties, people were wounded, some lost their lives and others were displaced. But, determining the level of destruction of properties and the exact number of people who were wounded, lost their lives and displaced became difficult with a lot of uncertainties. However, the table (1) below provided the sample of respondents from the three senatorial zones in Katsina state.

**Sample of the Respondents from Katsina Senatorial Zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>People injured</th>
<th>N0. of death</th>
<th>displaced</th>
<th>Properties destructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Many</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>NIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>3 houses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NIL</td>
<td>15 houses, 52 motor cycles, 25 cars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the first and second categories of the above table, the respondents stated that only two people and/or many people were injured during the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina Senatorial Zone respectively and there was no any incident like death, displacement or destruction of properties. But in the third category, the respondent noted that, seven people were injured, two people lost their lives and three houses were destroyed during the violence. While in the last category, the respondent said that nine people were injured, one lost his live, and fifteen houses, 52 motor cycles as well as 25 cars were burnt down during the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina Senatorial Zone.

**Table (2) Respondents Sample from Funtua Senatorial Zone**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>People injured</th>
<th>N0. of death</th>
<th>displaced</th>
<th>Properties destructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>40 houses, 20 motor cycles, 15 cars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>many</td>
<td>30 houses, 6 motor cycles, 15 cars, 20 churches and hotels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>many</td>
<td>Many houses, many motor cycles, many cars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>many</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>many</td>
<td>Many houses, many cars.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table indicated in first category that, thirty five people were injured, six died, fifty people were displaced and forty houses, 20 motor cycles as well as fifteen cars were destroyed and burned during the violence. Respondent in the second category posited that ten people injured, seven people lost their lives, many were displaced and thirty houses, six motor cycles, fifteen cars, twenty churches and hotels were destroyed. However, in the third category, the table shows that, seven people were injured and died respectively, many were displaced and many houses, motor cycles as well as cars were also destroyed. While the last respondent in the fourth category observed that, five people were killed, many people injured, displaced and there were destruction of many houses and cars. To that extend, one of the victims in funta senatorial zone, who is an Igbo man stated that, he lost up to N4, 045, 000.00 in his electrical store which were burnt down during the violence and the government compensated their landlord who own the shops, but yet there was no any compensation for them.

Table (3) Sample of the Respondents from Daura Senatorial Zone

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>People injured</th>
<th>No. of death</th>
<th>displaced</th>
<th>Properties destructed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12 houses, 15 motor cycles, 21 cars, 6 government buildings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7 houses, 4 motor cycles, 15 cars, 2 government buildings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>55 houses, 15 motor cycles, 16 cars, 3 government buildings.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It is important to know that Daura Senatorial District is also the zone of Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, who was the presidential candidate of the former Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and also perceived as the major contender from the North in the 2011 presidential general election. The combination of these factors makes the zone relatively intense during the election and this can be justified from the table above. For instance, the first column indicated that fifteen people were injured, six lost their lives, thirty displaced and twelve houses, fifteen motor cycles, twenty one cars as well as six governmental building were destroyed. Respondent in the second column stated that fourteen people were wounded, four people killed, eight were displaced and seven houses, four motor cycles, fifteen cars and two governmental buildings were also destroyed. In the last column of the table, it shows that twelve people were injured, ten died, forty were displaced and fifty five house, fifteen motor cycles, sixteen cars as well as three governmental buildings were destroyed during the violence.

As matter of fact the above analysis from the three senatorial zones revealed that, the magnitude effects of violence was at minimum level in Katsina senatorial zone, compared to the other two senatorial zones of Funtua and Daura during the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state.

The impacts of 2011 post presidential election violence in katsina state to democratization process in nigeria

In assessing the impacts of 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state to democratization process in Nigeria, the following questions were asked: due to the 2011 post presidential election violence, do you still have interest to participate in the 2015 forthcoming elections? And why? The following graph (5) determines the percentages of those responded on the questions.
The above graph indicated that despite the 2011 post presidential electoral violence in Katsina state, majority of the people still have interest to participate in the 2015 general elections. This was due to the fact that, out of 226 respondents, 181 representing 80% of the respondents indicated their interest and readiness to participate in the 2015 general elections. But, their interest to participate emanated from two broad reasons which polarized the respondents into two different camps. The first group believed that, it is their rights as citizens to participate in any election conducted by the state through casting their vote. The second camp was derived by the desire to bring about change in governance and leadership style of the country. On the other hand, 40 representing 18% of the respondents said “NO”, why because, some are victims of the violence therefore, afraid of been injured, wounded or even killed by thugs. While others believed that their votes or vote of masses does not matter. In other wards government and INEC officials collaborate to rig elections. The remaining 5 representing 2% of the respondents were undecided.

However, to further explore the effects of 2011 post presidential election violence on democratization process in Nigeria, another set of question was asked which states that, due to the violence, which regime do you think will be best for the country. The percentages of respondents were presented on the graph (6) below:

It is evident that, one of the major effects of 2011 post presidential election violence on democratization process in Nigeria was loss of confidence and legitimacy over a democratic regime by the electorates. To that extent, the above graph clearly shows that, out of the 226 respondents, 111 representing 49% of the respondents prepare “Military Regime” as the best form of governing the country, than “Democratic Regime” particularly due to the sense of insecurity, lack of law and order that would protect the votes of people, lives and properties during elections. 91 representing 40% of the respondents still prepared democratic regime despite their experiences.
in the 2011 elections violence. While 24 respondents, representing 11% of the respondents were undecided.

Another question asked was: Do you think the various regions in Nigeria can still continue to co-exist as one country under a democratic regime after the 2015 general elections?, And why? The graph (7) below supplies the percentages of respondents attracted by the questions.

The graph shows that, out of 226 respondents, 132 representing 58% of the respondents have hope that “YES” the various regions will continue to co-exist as one country under a democratic regime. Their reasons include; first, since Nigeria survived and the various regions continue to co-exist after the civil war in 1970, definitely the country will continue to survive as one nation no matter the situation. Secondly, they believed that it’s the politicians that are bad, always trying to divide the country along religious and ethnic line, but the different religions and ethnic groups of the country live in peace with one another. And lastly, they argued that there is a lot of economic and social relationship that tied the various regions and ethnic groups together to the extent that none of the region can enjoy standing on its own.

On the other hand, 65 representing 29% of the respondents believed that, the various regions were no longer interested to co-exist with one another as one nation under a democratic regime and cited the 2011 post presidential election violence in Nigeria as one of the indication of willingness of the various regions to disintegrate from each other. Many of the respondents that belong to this assertion based their arguments on the fact that, the political class are always using religious sentiments, regional differences, and ethnic cleavages in pursuing their political agenda which tend to instigate and generate tension all over the country. They also noted that, injustice and lack of good governance from the centre threatening the long lasting peace of the country to continue to remain as one under a democratic regime. The remaining 29 representing 13% of the respondents were undecided. Finally, the graph (8) below provides the percentages of respondents on the classification or rating democracy in Nigeria.
However, the graph above reveals that more than half of the respondents rated Nigeria’s democracy between very low and low. This was because out of 226 respondents 66(29%) and 91(40%) of the respondents noted that democracy in Nigeria is still at a level between very low and low respectively. Those who believed that it’s at moderate level constitute only 43 representing 20% of the respondents. Very insignificant number of the respondents rated Nigeria’s democracy between high and very high 2(1%) and 2(1%) of the respondents respectively, while 22 representing 9% of the respondents were undecided.

**Conclusion**

The nature, extent and magnitude of violence associated with 2011 post presidential election posed a serious threat to the national quest for stable democratization process in Nigeria as a whole. This paper reveals that electoral malpractices and religious sentiments were the core causes of the 2011 post presidential election violence in Katsina state that led to many lost of lives and properties, to the extent that many people even prepare military regime than the democratic situation of the country and others were personated by the idea of disintegrating the various regions that were united for a century. These factors and many others threatening the peace, unity and democratization process of the country, which if not properly and decisively cure off, can lead to termination of the fourth republic as it happened in 1966 and 1983 or even lead to a short lived civil war as it happened in Kenya and cote d’ivoire.

**Recommendations**

i. To prevent future post election violence generally, government at both federal and state level must act fairly to identify and prosecute those who took part or aided the 2011 post presidential election violence whether among the ruling party members or from the opposition parties.

ii. The conduct of elections must to be free and fair, if not voters will always be willing to react towards any attempt by incumbent or any other politicians to rig or alter election processes.

iii. Politicians should not be using ethnicity and religions to garner support and polarize the populace along ethnic and religious line that always tend to sparked or encourage post election violence.

iv. The use of security agents by the government during elections should be appropriate i.e. ensuring law and order, protect lives and properties. In other words, the police should be politically neutral and their number should be adequate, well equipped and funded to be able to overcome any likely violence that may occur.

v. Both Federal and state governments should embark on economic reforms that will provide more jobs to both skills and un-skills populace, thereby reducing the high level of poverty, crime and unemployment rate as millions of graduates are roaming streets across the states without jobs.

**References**


**Newspapers**
