PERSPECTIVE OF FORMATION OF “PREFERENCE-BASED ORDER” IN THE NEAR GEOPOLITICS OF IRAN (MIDDLE EAST)

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Abstract
The goal of this paper is to explain that signs of changes in realistic order are in shadow of emergence of political and economical democratic revolutions in Middle East region. Accordingly, by liberal approach of Andrew Moravcsik for preferences, we propound the assumption that “A casual relationship between public preferences and foreign policies of countries engaged in revolutions cause consistency of foreign relations of these countries, and this challenges current realistic order. This paper includes three sections: The first section expresses formation of liberal order based on public preferences. The second section expresses formation trends of this order. The third section deals with policies of vulnerable countries from this order and their effects on security of Iran. The findings of this research show that disorders of disproportion of Iranian policies with public preferences in Revolutionary states have created an opportunity for Turkey to profit from recent Arabic Movements.

Keywords: Middle East, Arabic revolutions, realistic order, public preferences, Egypt, Libya.

Introduction
Arabic revolutions or Arabic Spring are opposition waves toward political and economic structures of Arabic governments, which have been commenced from Dec. 18, 2010 in Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Maritain, Oman, Iraq, and Sudan. In some of these countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, these opposition waves could attain their main motto; in some of countries such as Sudan, Jordan, Kuwait, Algeria, and Iraq, they caused regression of governments and granting rewards for political reformations; and in some countries such as Saudi Arabia, these were suppressed by martial coup de’tats. In some countries such as Syria and Bahrain, these oppositions continue. In this political process, we see a kind of consistency of foreign policies and government behaviors in those countries that succeeded to change their political system and have replaced their governments. This research intends to find the reasons of this consistency.

Although this paper focuses on consistency of foreign policies in successful countries in their revolutions, consistency with protesters in engaged countries cause more probable analyses for future scenarios for regional order in Middle East.

In successful countries, in which people succeeded to form a democratic government, there are Tunisia with escape of Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011; Egypt with dismissal of Mobarok on February 11, 2011; Libya with downfall of Ghazafi on August 23, 2011; and Yemen with replacement of Ali Abdollah Saleh with Abdolrabeh Mansur Alhadi on February 27, 2012.
Main question: Why do we see common political directions about most important regional subjects after appointment of revolutionary governments in Tunisia (Al-nehzah), Egypt (Morsi from Ekhvan-almoslemin), Libya (revolutionary council), and Yemen (Abdolrabeh Mansur)?

Sub-main questions:
1. Are these consistencies temporal or long-term? 2. What are the effects of these similar positions on regional order, what countries are pros and cons of these countries, and what are their reactions?

Research assumption
Similar popular preferences of these countries have produced similar positions for governments as representatives of people. These cooperations have created a “preferences-based regional order” in Middle East.

This paper has three sections: The first section expresses formation of liberal order based on public preferences. The second section expresses formation trends of this order. The third section deals with policies of vulnerable countries from this order and expresses their deviations from this order and their effects on security of Iran.

The findings of this research show that disorders of consistency of Iranian policies with public preferences have created an opportunity for Turkey to profit from recent Arabic developments.

Section 1: Theoretical framework: Preferences-based liberal theory
The primary assumption (the great assumption) of liberal theory –relations between governments and societies and behavior of governments are formed by social goals implied with governments preferences– can be expressed 3 basic assumptions¹. These assumptions are suitable foundations for social theories in IR that specify natures of players, governments, and international systems.

Assumption 1: Individuals and groups as main players of international policies
In this theory, the main players of international policy are those individuals and groups that are intellectual and risk-averse and organize their social actions under restrictions of lack of sources, conflict of values, and changes of social penetration in order to develop their sources. Liberal theory is based on bottom-up view of policy in which demands of individuals and social groups are pre-political. Political behavior is on civil society bed and is understood as aggregated distinguished desires of individuals with limited rationalism, social obligations, and source assignment. Persons that are distinguished socially, define mental and material interests independent from policy, then they develop these interests through political transactions and aggregated actions. Liberal theory assumes that individuals and groups intellectually act to follow mental and material welfare².

Defining the interests of social players is a pivot for liberals. By rejection of ideal imagination (existing an automatic harmony between interests of individuals and groups) liberals theory in international relations (Moravcsik theory) believes that deficiency and differentiation are inevitable tools of competition³. By this view, wherever there are aggregated transaction and reaction motives, individuals and groups utilize them. The more the interests, the stronger the motives for aggregated actions.

To follow these goals, individuals and risk-averse, namely they severely defend existing capitals, but they consider risks and costs when follow-up new interests. Anyway, in fact people act this averagely, not in all cases. Some people may be risk-taking or have non-rational behaviors in certain societies⁴. Liberal theory tries to extend social conditions under which autonomy governments close to cooperation of opposition⁵. Oppositional social
demands and force application to follow interests are created under shadow of some reasons which some of them are related to our discussion: divergence of fundamental beliefs, opposition for rare material goods, and imbalance of political power. Deep and incompatible differences in beliefs to supply basic goods –borders, cultures, political organizations, domestic social procedures– promote opposition, while complement beliefs promote coordination and cooperation. Deficiency trends severe opposition for sources by increment of motives of social players to accept costs and risks for obtaining those sources, while relative abundance of sources decreases oppositions by providing opportunities for individuals and groups. Finally, where social imbalance is much, opposition is more, while where social power is distributed equally, it is more probable that individuals and groups follow their interests through mutual interaction or strong and lawful internal political organizations.6

Assumption 2: Governmental preferences representatives of their societies
Governments (and other political organizations) are representatives of their societies and government officers define interests and actions by their government interests. By liberal concept of domestic policy, governments are not players, but they are representative institutions that transact, build, and rebuilt by social players. Actions and representative institutions form a “transitional movement” by which they translate social preferences and powers of individuals and groups into governmental policies. Individuals deviate toward governments to achieve their goals that they cannot obtain them efficiently. Therefore, governments policies are formed by interests and powers of individuals and groups (inside and outside of governmental system) that permanently enforce decision-makers to follow-up their preferences-based policies. This neither means adoption of pluralism view about internal policies in which all individuals and groups have equal penetration for determination of governmental policies, nor inapplicable with government organizations. There is no government with global political representation and without prejudice and discrimination, and each government represents some individuals and groups more than the others. By liberal theory, nature of governmental organizations (autonomic or democracy) considers interests of people, which is a key element for measures of government in international level. In liberal theory, international relations do not mean attribution of them to government organizations, but they include constant specifications of processes and –official or nonofficial– political currents.9
Here we should propound to define preferences in order to prevent mixture of concept of governmental preferences with other concepts such as strategy, tactic, and policy. Policies are transitional bargain positions and negotiation requests that comprise political goals for foreign policy of a government everyday. Governmental preferences are a set of fundamental interests that are defined in all governments. Preferences by definition are independent from strategies of other players, so they are forecasts toward political interactions between governments such as foreign threats, motives, information manipulation, etc. Instead, in many cases –e.g. in analysis of plays theory– strategies and tactics that are used instead of preferences, are political options that are defined between average political goals and are applied when governments define an interest –e.g. preserving power balance, decrement or preserving hostility, or applying global leadership.10 Liberal theory emphasizes on the results of behavior of a government by changes of basic preferences, not changes in strategic conditions under which they follow their preferences. Representative organizations and actions not only determine social alliances, but they express fashion of their representations. These differences are very important and vital.
Considering assumptions 1 and 2, it is obvious that governments will not act automatically in the framework of stabilized interests and homogenous concepts of security and welfare, but they have distinguished functions and interpretations of security, welfare, and dominancy as
preferences that are represented by actions and governmental organizations. By liberalism, these goals have different interactions and their interstate definitions are very different with different causal results.

**Assumption 3: Interdependence of international system: preference interdependence**

Configurations of preferences of dependent governments specify behaviors of governments. For liberals, behavior of government reflects different patterns for preferences of that government. Governments need goals, a principle in their current subjects in order to provoke hostility, to propose cooperation, or any other behavior. The exact nature of these concepts creates policies. This does not mean each government follows its ideal policies without regarding to the policies of others, but it means each government follows accomplishment of its distinguished preferences under restrictions due to the preferences of other governments. Liberal theory not only rejects realistic assumptions that believe governmental preferences are oppositions, but also it does not accept the assumptions in which governmental preferences are convergent. In contrast, liberals accept different configurations of governmental preferences. Theoretical relations between governmental preferences from one hand, and behavior of one or several governments on the other hand, create a concept of mutual dependence. Mutual political dependence here means a set of benefit-cost for foreign communities when a dominant group tries to accomplish its preferences. Liberal theory assumes that mutual political dependence patterns incur obligatory restrictions on behavior of governments. These patterns are in three categories to accomplish their preferences:

- Where preferences are convergent or competitive, that in this case, policies are optimum for others and there are strong motives for co-existence with low opposition.
- Where the sum of governmental preferences is zero, that in this case, efforts of dominant social groups in a country to accomplish its preferences incur costs on other dominant social groups in other communities. In this situation, government encounter bargain play with multiple goals and benefits and many oppositions. Despite realists that believe power configuration motives opposition, liberal theory believes oppositional preferences configuration to accept cost and risk in a country severs interstate oppositions. In other words, oppositions need an offensive with revisionism preferences, not revisionism strategies by realistic view. For example, realists believe martial costs will increase in reaction to martial rehabilitation of enemies because of their strategic changes with constant preferences (power balance). However, liberal theory believes that increment of martial costs is due to modern ideology of new dominant groups in internal scene of a country with different preferences from the past, and this is the reason of strategy changes. Thus, liberal theory notices basic reasons and it can declare their behaviors and developments better than realists.
- Where motives are combinational and different preferences cause combinational pattern for competition and cooperation. Plays such as compatibility, Prisoner's dilemma, are the examples.

Consequently, it can be said that by liberalism, cooperation depends preferential patterns. Total plan to form regional and international orders in liberal theory is as follows:
Section 2: Arabic revolutions and new trends of preferences-based order instead of realistic order
This section tries to point new trends by Arabic revolutions that may create a new regional order in Middle East.

Common public preferences and formation of an “Arabic Common Civil Society”
After Arabic populism trend due to Pan-Arabism and its combination with socialism, that could attract deprived strata of Arabic society in revolutionary countries such as Libya, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen in 1950s and 1960s, no other intellectual trend couldn’t organize “combination of goals” and decrease identity distinguishes to achieve unique goals of Arab communities. Decrement of value differences among all strata caused formation of a civil society based on public identity. This public identity returned toward those requests that had no objectors other than advocates of dominant regimes. Inside the Tunisia and Egypt societies, even many affiliates of dominant regimes jointed to objectors. Regarding confirmation of the research assumption, the important point is that these public preferences are not for a special society –such as Tunisia or Egypt–, but this trend is seen in all Arabic countries –either in successful countries or unsuccessful countries, such as Bahrain. Despite the first motive, public preferences had differences by priority –e.g. economic poverty for ordinary people and political freedom for open-minded was a motive–, however, strategies for problems-solving are equal for all strata, and it was change of political system. This equality of preferences were represented as opposition with dictator regimes, opposition with broad objections in civil and political freedoms, objection with political and economical decay of government, objection with economic poverty, and unemployment.

The implication of this research is that this preferential coordination forms a common civil society in Arabic societies. The internal and external outcomes of this common civil society
will decrease value discriminations beyond political and dummy borders, and the demand of a special country will be converted to the demands of other countries, and the sense of “indifference towards fate of his colleagues in other countries” due to national borders will be converted to the sense of “helping each other in campaign”\textsuperscript{16}. In addition, because of similarity of these public preferences with public preferences of international thoughts, a kind international support will be followed. Victory of Moslems in Tunisia — with motto of equality and liberalism—, Ekhvan in Egypt, success of “Construction and Equality” in Libya, demands for economic reformation and political freedoms in Yemen, and demands for political freedom and economic equality in Bahrain are signs of a common identity — common preferences— between these countries\textsuperscript{17}. In this situation, the question is that “what is the political resultant of formation of this Arabic common civil society and what is its effect on the modern regional order? 

The political resultant of this common civil Arabic society due to common preferences is important by its effects on modern regional order by two views:

- Abstract, material, and logistic support from objectors of other countries engaged in revolution to achieve the final goal, which is fall of political system. For this trend, we point to continuous supports of Tunisians from Egyptian revolutionary people; support of Egyptians after victory and Tunisians from Libyans; support of revolutionary people of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Iraq from Yemenites; and support of them from revolutionary people of Syria, Bahrain, and Algeria. This trend continues inevitably, although sometimes there are deviations from it — e.g. support from Yemenites—, but its general trend goes toward support of each other, which forms formation of political societies.

- Formation of public preferences in foreign policy of after-revolution government in their countries. This is the second feature of this modern order.

**Common foreign policy by common public preferences**

This section is based on two assumptions:

- When people with common preferences precipitate the dominant governments, foreign policies of these countries will change according to the new definition. So, foreign policy based on personal national interests will change into foreign policy based on real national interests and public values. For example, the foreign policy of new Egypt will be different with the foreign policy of previous Egypt during Mobarak against Palestine.

- Share of public values in revolutionary societies: This is one of the factors that resembles foreign policies of these countries. As Krasner says, national interests of countries stems from two material – geopolitics, internal technical and martial power, human force, population combination, — and mental – public values, public identities, national ideals, public strategic culture, views of elites, — factors\textsuperscript{18}. Here there is the implication that at least one of these factors is provided for convergence by share of public preferences. The common values of new elites in political power by views of classic theoreticians, such as Carl Deutsch, are one of the main factors of political convergence\textsuperscript{19}.

Regarding the two above assumptions, we can imply that:

- In one hand, selected elites by a democratic polling in revolutionary countries, organize their foreign policies by public views, and the following developments may affect the regional order:
  - Change of regional and global interests components in revolutionary countries
  - Change of regional friends and enemies of revolutionary countries
– Change of political treaties with other countries
– On the other hand, regarding to common foreign policies, the following developments in regional order may be anticipated:
  – Priority of Palestine problem than the other regional subjects
  – Support from internal movements of other regional countries in order to empower people to determine their fates
  – Increment of economic and security cooperations in revolutionary countries

“Mutual cooperative preferential dependence” pattern in Arabic countries: New blocking
A mentioned in the previous section, there are three types of inter-governmental relations in international dimension by internal preferences of countries: objective, cooperative, and combinational. Regarding to the subject of this paper about determinant trends of regional order, in future trends of international interactions of revolutionary countries, we see formation of “mutual cooperative preferential dependence” between revolutionary countries and Arabic democratic. By view of authors, this mutual dependence will be developed either for “interaction subject” or “interaction area”. By subject of interaction, they consider security, economic, and social subjects; and by interaction area, they empower cooperation between revolutionary countries. We can see the most important dimension of this cooperation in “modern blocking of regional powers”.

• Neo- Blocking in Arab Union
Regarding to the public preferences in revolutionary countries and along to the previous implications, formation of a favorable block inside Arab Union is obvious. Although Arab Union was the scene of competition between two groups of “Compromising Conservatives”– by leadership of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and cooperation of countries of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council– and “Anti-conservation Front”– by leadership of Syria and cooperation of Lebanon and Libya, now we see a Neo-Blocking that we can call it “democratic block” against “power-driven block”. The democratic block includes Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen and probably Bahrain and Syria; and power-driven block includes Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and countries of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council.

• Revised blocking in Islamic Cooperation Organization
Regarding to directions of foreign policies of Islamic countries, it seems that behavioral intersection between Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya with Turkey and Malaysia in this organization is more than that with other kingdom countries. This is because their internal democratic environment forces their statesmen to cooperate with each other and places them in front of kingdom powers in the region. Consequently, it is expected that regional monarchies oppose with this trend.

Expansion of cooperation with democratic world Against Non-democratic world
The democratic features of foreign policies in revolutionary countries are more in democratic countries. West governments, because of their democratic claims, and novel economies– India and Brazil– and their world countries are the most probable strategic cooperatives of revolutionary counties, rather than non-democratic countries such as China and Russia, which were advocates of non-democratic countries such as Libya and Syria. Till 1991– breakup of cold war– China and Russia were advocates of left democratic governments, and west governments were advocates of power-driven governments. But it seems that this equation has been reversed now.
Conclusion: Security effects of modern order on national security of Iran

The perspective of the modern order in Middle East forms in shadow of Arabic revolutions and it affects the national security of Iran by two aspects:

–Weakening Public diplomacy of Iran and passivity in recognition of religious democratic of Iran for Arabic revolutions,

–Policies of regional and global competitors in apposing relation of new Arabic elites with Iran’s government.

Although Iranian government has no compatibility with Sunni religion because of its Shiite nature, but Iranian government can become a pattern for these countries by proving the successful experience of political Islam with democracy– by internal success. Now, Public diplomacy indices of Iran in the region are not satisfactory. On the other hand, west and other regional powers are going to introduce a Turkish Islamic pattern– Justice and Development Party Model– in Islamic countries. Formation of parties of “Justice and Freedom” and “Justice and Construction” in Egypt and Libya and analysis of speeches of Rashed Al-Ghonoushi in appraisal of a Turkish model of government, show enforcement of general diplomacy of Turkey against Iran.

Another threat for national security of Iran is non-presence of Iran in management of regional developments along public preferences. Advertisement of western countries on introducing Iran as an advocate of Syria has placed Iran in opposite of regional public preferences. Totally, by analysis of opportunity/Threat, we can say that in current situation and by assuming continue of situation of foreign policy of Iran, the countries that are threatened by this modern order are Saudi Arabia and countries member of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council in the first stage and Iran in the second stage.

Saudi Arabia and countries member of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council– including Qatar– try to control foreign policies of these countries because of their fear to spread these revolutionary movements to their countries by activation of economic diplomacy and utilizing oil rent and investment on their advocates in these countries. Extended investment of Saudi Arabia on Al-Noor Party in Egyptian presidential election(2012) and investment of Qatar on Al- qaeda forces in Libya and Syria are examples of these efforts. Iran, by defending Syria has gone to margin in the preferential system of revolutionary countries, and Iran must remedy this problem.

References


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