FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE PROCESS OF UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT IN THE MANAGEMENT OF AGRICULTURE WITHIN THE ERSTWHILE BOPHUTHATSWANA AND SOME LESSONS FOR DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA IN TERMS OF POLICY IMPERATIVES AND THE KEY ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

This paper deals with the factors that contributed to the processes of uneven development in the management of agriculture in the former Bophuthatswana state. In outlining these factors certain management issues will be discussed by providing empirical evidence in this regard. Policy reforms in general will be raised in parts of the discussion. This is based on the premise that the amount of external assistance that would have been required to sustain Bophuthatswana’s economy and state in terms of addressing the manifest problems within government as a whole and for purposes of agricultural development and for reducing poverty, would have been substantially higher and will have been required for a much longer period. In attempting this, it is acknowledged that the recital of likely macroeconomic effects leaves out some important factors, and that the aggregative model does not pretend to capture all the richness and complexities of the former state’s agriculture and economy. Therefore, one cannot model the effects of all policy alternatives, nor does the discussion address questions of institutional or administrative reforms, except for introducing very briefly a specific viewpoint and opinion on the options that were open to Bophuthatswana. In as much as they affected its future, in terms of the constitutional proposals that were emerging in South Africa in the dynamic period of transition that ultimately led to the acceptance and construction of the democratic South African State in April of 1994.
The emphasis of the paper is therefore six fold. Firstly, it captures certain salient issues in respect of uneven development and the management of agriculture from the importance of an historical perspective and appeals for a paradigm shift by the democratic South African state in respect to agriculture and industrialization. More importantly, this appeal is grounded on the basis of a call for incorporating both the macro and micro in the South African reform process. Secondly, it exposes the MBA management student to the above, by exposing the student to agricultural discourse and its importance to business and management principles, and issues pertaining to development. Thirdly, it exemplifies the importance to Business Schools in general to incorporate a paradigm shift in respect of the types of issues that need to be included within the syllabi of MBA degrees and programmes. Fourthly, it brings to the fore a host of issues that students must look at in a critical manner within their studies when looking at agricultural, economic and development issues. Some of these are: poverty, telecommunications, nutrition, health issues, population growth, manpower and employment, illiteracy, education, family planning, research, rural welfare, technological change, variability in agriculture, agricultural business and its industrialization, organization, policy implications, administration, physical infrastructure, farmer participation, transport, extension problems and so on, amidst a host of other important factors (These are not discussed in this paper). Fifth, that most or in fact almost all, revolutionary societies that have fought struggles against their colonial masters’ over time are generally structured and developed on the basis of the importance of agriculture, and the land question, in order to secure their independence and economies, for purposes of development and the promotion of the general welfare of their people, by means of redistribution of land and the promotion of their agricultural potential. These two aspects have in the main not been realized in almost 20 years of freedom and democracy in South Africa, and has therefore contributed to massive poverty, inequality and unemployment within the country. Lastly, or sixth that historical analysis is vital for purposes of understanding and elaborating on issues that affect development, with the hope that the history of the past would allow present governments to deal with underdevelopment, uneven development and agricultural challenges in a more cogent and intellectual manner, in order that they may set into motion proper policy initiatives to address the manifest problems that confront so – called Third World countries.

Despite the inherent difficulties, some attention must be given to the purposes and goals of the management of agriculture. Why do farmers do so badly will be posed and discussed? The primacy of industrialization will be very briefly discussed and assessed. Lastly, it is hoped that managers of agriculture within the public sector of democratic South Africa, as well as the government will be in a position to learn from the experiences of the erstwhile Bophuthatswana, in a manner that they would not repeat the mistakes made by the former homeland in respect of the processes of uneven development and the poor management of agricultural development.
Key Words: Economic, Transition, Variability, Unilateral, Patronage, Nepotism, Agriculture, Extension, Development

INTRODUCTION

Since independence in 1977, and the constant change in agricultural hierarchies and the ever-present influence of agricultural parastatals and the unilateral decisions of the former State President Lucas Mangope, there had not been an approved and acceptable agricultural policy within Bophuthatswana. This had led to a serious problem in respect of analysis, guidance, development, intellectual understanding, staffing at the upper echelons of a disjointed structure. This had been pursued on the basis of political patronage and nepotism, party and tribal affiliations, thus making the evaluation of agriculture and agricultural development in terms of acceptable and accountable processes very difficult, and, had not been possible up to the latter part of 1993 (No different in present democratic South Africa, today). In order to underscore the assertion made, firstly it must be recognized that policy is a salient and vital instrument, used in analyzing objectives and goals.

Without a defined policy, agriculture, extension and development evaluation, became all the more difficult and meaningless, and negated the very fabric of the rule of law and the process of public accountability. These assertions must also be clearly understood from the perspective of the generic principles of public management and public administration. Planning is an instrument of policy, and therefore, no planning can take place without a defined and acceptable policy. It is also used as an instrument of audit. Without implementation of a policy for audit /measuring /evaluating agriculture, development and extension, there cannot be any sustained and meaningful implementation of the generic processes, which revolve around the cardinal principles of policy, planning, staffing, procedures, financing and control /accountability and eventual budgeting. In reality, the agricultural budget is a reflection of government policy expressed in monetary terms, but without a defined policy and in terms of a practical theoretical framework, the agricultural responsibilities cannot be evaluated in respect of objectives. In short the entire agricultural scenario and spectrum, defied the generic principles of public management, administration and the crucial aspect of accountability.

FURTHER ISSUES IN RESPECT TO MISSION, POLICY AND PLANNING WITHIN THE ERSTWHILE BOPHUTHATSWANA

As a starting point of this recital the mission statement of the Department of Agriculture read as follows, “It is the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources to serve the people of Bophuthatswana who continuously use agricultural and related resources to improve their quality of life by formulating, monitoring, and coordinating macro agricultural objectives, policies and strategies” (Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, 1991:2). The goals and objectives were not elaborated upon in a policy document as approved by government, with no
mention of how this will be achieved and reflected upon. The Department of Agriculture did not formulate and coordinate macro – agricultural objectives, policies and strategies in respect of agriculture. The mission statement captured only macro – agricultural perspectives in the development of agriculture and made no reference to micro – perspectives, as it related to subsistence farming and the peasantry, and the emphasis was, therefore, on the development of commercial farming only. The Department of Agriculture in terms of defined financial prescripts received funding for the whole of agriculture. It distributed these funds to the six agricultural parastatals and thus there was no accountability of the funds once distributed (Annual Report, Department of Agriculture, 1991:2).

The Director of Finance (1991) acknowledged that “the Department did not have the accounting capability and was impotent in the absence of a National Agricultural Policy, that audit was not its brief nor was it a brief of the Auditor General’s Office or the responsibility of the Treasury, which was the supreme financial authority of the government of the day. The authority of the Department of Agriculture was thus usurped by the six agricultural parastatals with sanction from the State President and power was primarily vested in the hands of the Agricultural Development Corporation (Agricor). Agricor had become a very powerful institution within the Department of Agriculture and within the agricultural sector of Bophuthatswana. The Secretary of Agriculture was reduced and completely relegated to a subordinate role and was required to report to the CEO of Agricor. The above scenario was further exacerbated by scrapping of Agricor in 1992, by means of Presidential decree, and replaced by a new Board now called the Agricultural Services Board (Agriserve). The restructuring of the agricultural sector was once again overhauled, changes made by means of restructuring including the replacement of staff by new personnel. This led to total chaos, the lowering of staff morale, complete disarray and chaos with no coherence to agricultural development. The implication was that the Department of Agriculture had to now take a consistent leading role in the future direction of agriculture, only due to the worsening economic situation. The agricultural parastatals used public funds without the necessary checks and balances and there was no public accountability. A planning section within the Department of Agriculture was already in place, but was underutilized and lacked the vision and leadership and, therefore, negated the content of the mission statement because it was not involved in any form of macro – planning. Planning and, so – called policy making took place at the levels of the parastatals pursuing their own agenda. As concerns veterinary services the Director of Veterinary Services stated as follows: “There continued to be a problem with the control of the field staff of the division of veterinary services. As from 1 April 1988, the field staff of the Department had been transferred to Agricor for purposes of functional control. Such a method of management causes a lot of unnecessary problems and, in this case led to the disruption of the disease surveillance system which then led to livestock owners receiving poor disease control and also disruptions in the trade of animals and animal products (Director of Veterinary Services, Internal Memorandum, 1992). It impinged upon international and national disease control mechanisms and brought about dual control.
The issues discussed above clearly indicate both the abject paucity of direction and that agriculture in the Bophuthatswana context was torn apart by a maze of intrigue, not conforming to a set of national and international rules and regulations. Agricultural development is a dynamic process but there were no checks and balances, in order to measure or monitor and evaluate agricultural extension programmes and general agricultural development, across the total spectrum of agriculture in the erstwhile Bophuthatswana (Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1991). This situation confirms the view that extension and development was not aimed at the economic empowerment of the poor and was not also aimed at achieving social justice. It underscores the all embracing fact that there was a total lack of understanding these concepts, which are mutually exclusive, yet dependent on each other, but interchangeable. There was also no understanding of the felt / perceived needs of farmers for agricultural training, and a lesser understanding from an intellectual base of the consequences of uneven development, in terms of the development dynamics of developing nations.

There were those within the upper echelons of agriculture who became powerfully entrenched, in spite of their incapabilities and lack of knowledge and poor administrative skills. They believed that mutual consultation in agricultural policy – making, with the various parastatals would somehow magically provide the best solutions to social and agrarian questions and problems. According to Broudy (1961:77), “consultation among thieves (at best or worst) produces only more efficient thievery (deception). Without the goal of self – perfection of individuals to enhance the general welfare and good life, consultation is futile, without the consultation, the self – performance is gratuitous.” Consultation or discussion as such is, therefore, according to the writer, not a guarantee of democracy or even an indubitable symptom of it. It becomes a guarantee when it is a means to clarification of, the common good in a particular problematic situation. In the problematic agricultural dynamic of the former Bophuthatswana, consultation and discussion only brought about further entrenchment of the leading agricultural role players, politicians, the landed elite, and greater confusion and lack of agreement, in order to bring about an all embracing and accompanying agricultural policy.

There is no blueprint for development and extension. However, cognizance had to be taken of the realities confronting agriculture in this region, in a period of dynamic transition and political change. The government failed to realize that agriculture and extension was a dismal failure and contributed overtly to the process of uneven development, and that a revitalized agenda for agriculture was required in order to address the manifest problems, and in order to redress the imbalances of uneven development. The same intervention is now required in democratic South Africa, after nearly 20 years of freedom and democracy because Agriculture has not served the interest of the historically marginalized poor.

In concluding the first part of this recital, it is appropriate and apt to quote Anjan Chakrabarti who states in his article – The faltering miracle story of India and neoliberalism, as follows: “Policy
paralysis appears in different ways. The policy paralysis is a paralysis of thinking that shuts out any solution other than what is the ‘consensus.’ A competitive market economy with capitalist appropriation and distribution of surplus in a global setting is the consensus in the historical episode that, however, also continues to burden us with a growing set of changes or ‘reforms’ that deepen the very processes and system which are responsible for crisis. How and in what manner these so-called ‘reforms’ are going to put the economy back on track are issues not touched upon. How they are going to put some sanity into our present unstable and volatile systemic regime is also left untouched. Indeed, in a scenario where the malaise is a systemic encompassing both the micro and macro. It is hardly surprisingly that the policies are not working. The debate from the radical side is disturbing too, being stuck on the need for the enhanced role of the state which is at times, combined with the nationalist trope of self-reliance. There is hardly any questioning of, and debate on, the issue of systemic transformation and the politics of producing it. We have moved from a state sponsored development paradigm to a private market economy driven paradigm, and found both to be wanting. Changing the role of the state (say moving towards a strong state) without challenging the economic system is unsustainable as history has shown us: in fact, both must be addressed together. To put it somewhat differently, both the micro and macro, in tandem, must be made the object of questioning and transformation” (Chakrabarti, posted to Sanjay Perera to Philosophers for Change, November, 1, 2012).

The above views were ignored or could not have been understood in the contest of the erstwhile Bophuthatswana and its policy makers. By the same token, it is not being understood by the South African government, in nearly 20 years of independence and freedom. State intervention together with the economy must be looked at together and more cogently, in respect of South Africa. It is therefore, a salutary warning to the democratic South African government to heed this advice, because its policy making and reform agenda is in a state of paralysis, and therefore, it must usher in a paradigm shift in terms of the combination of the micro and macro, in respect of its policy making, in order to promote the general welfare or face the consequences of turmoil and resistance, in the years that lie ahead. Or make the same mistakes as the erstwhile Bophuthatswana and large parts of the developing world and Africa in general. The former Bophuthatswana makes up a large portion of the new North West Province of the Republic of South Africa, or democratic South Africa must continue on a path of destructive neoliberalism.

THE KEY ROLE OF AGRICULTURE

Having outlined some of the problems in respect to policy issues, the key role of agriculture in economic development will briefly be explored. Economic development is a process by which a population increases the efficiency with which it provides desired goods and services, thereby increasing per capita levels of living and general well-being. “nearly one third of the world’s population lives in nations in which annual per capita income averages over 500 USA dollars, whilst the remaining two thirds occupy much of Asia, Africa and Latin America” (Mellor, 1980:3).
(The statistics provided by Mellor are pertinent and relevant on the basis that, they assume significance in respect to Bophuthatswana and Africa as a whole at that time). Shah (2006:1) states that “half the world – nearly three billion people live on less than two dollars a day and that, according to UNICEF, 30 000 children die each day due to poverty.” Kofi Anan former Secretary General of the UN (2006: 6 -35) stated that “almost half the world’s population lives on less than two dollars a day, yet even this statistic fails to capture the humiliation, powerlessness and brutal hardship that is the daily lot of the world’s poor.” Government sources in the former Bophuthatswana indicated that per capita income was in the region of R840 per month for the majority of the population (Personal Communication, Department of Economic Affairs, 1992).

When analyzing the distribution of households according to income group, Pieterse (1984:6) states that “53 percent of all households in former Bophuthatswana earned less than R2, 000 per annum; 28 percent earned between R2, 000 and R4, 000 per annum and 19 percent earned a little over R4, 000 per annum. (Have these figures really changed for the poor in South Africa today?). Given the global economic crisis, the high inflation rates that currently plague Southern African states - it is obvious that the above figures would not have improved over time within the Bophuthatswana homeland and present day South Africa”. Clearly, while development occurs, the population grows and per capita incomes rise. To feed more people a better quality diet, agricultural production must increase (declining in present day South Africa). However, a rising level of living pre – supposes not only an increasing per capita demand for food, but also a larger supply of other commodities. In addition, the capacity of the agricultural sector to absorb an increased labour force is very limited in most countries. For these reasons, economic development also requires rapid expansion of the non – agricultural sectors of low income countries. Bophuthatswana did not attempt to accomplish this or move substantially in this direction. Expansion of the non – agricultural sectors required vast quantities of capital. Because agriculture initially commands most of the population, income, and capital, it follows that the additional capital must be raised in large parts from the agricultural sector. Thus agriculture must produce major increases in agricultural production, but it must also make significant net contributions to the capital needs of other sectors of the economy. The nature of this burden has an important influence on selecting the means of developing agriculture as does another role of agriculture, the direct provision of welfare. In respect of welfare Bophuthatswana’s performance was dismal.

RISE AND FALL OF THE AFRICAN PEASANTRY

Today and since the advent of democracy in 1994, the former Black homelands and Bantustans present a sorry sight of destitution, demoralization and neglect. The erstwhile Bophuthatswana was no exception to this scenario. Large parts of vegetation, whole sheets of earth had been washed away from hill – sides and deep dongas scar the valley sides. “The reasons for this unhappy state of affairs are in one sense self evident – the 13 percent of South Africa reserved for Black settlement was manifestly incapable of supporting its human and animal population. Yet in popular belief and
in many more expert opinions, African societies are often held to be conspirators in their plight (Alcock, 1973:2 – 16). Peasant conservatism, inertia, improvidence and sloth are regularly evoked as reasons why Black rural societies have failed to adapt, and as contributory factors to their present desperate state. A considerable amount of literature has been produced over the last 30 years which has gone a long way towards exploding the myth in the continent as a whole, but little of this has found its way into public discourse and consciousness.

Colin Bundy’s path breaking “Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry,” first published in 1981, falls into this category and its appearance in a second edition in 1988, reviewed by Philip Bonner (The Star, 1988:12) bears relevance to this paper. Bundy’s (1988) work is subsequently discussed on the basis that it represents a milestone in South African history and has caused a radical shift in historical thinking. In the time since its publication, however (and more particularly since the appearance of his seminal article on the subject in 1972), a number of limitations have been exposed, which Bundy freely acknowledges in the new preface to this edition. Bundy (1988) focuses primarily on the Eastern Cape between 1840 and 1913, and his findings and extrapolations can be extended to most areas of South Africa and the homelands. The first of his two initial theses is that the “the period 1860 – 1890 witnessed the growth of an African peasantry. Starting on a relatively modest scale on missions and among primarily refugee communities from neighbouring independent African societies (notably the Fingo’s and Mfengu), production for the market ‘exploded’ between the 1870’s and 1889’s, extending geographically into the Transkei and Griqualand East, embracing African tribesmen residing on communal lands.” Rather than being inhabited by a traditional conservatism and constrained by inertia and sloth, this rapidly growing peasantry responded eagerly to market opportunities and the possibilities of capital accumulation, they demonstrated great imitative and a keen receptiveness to new ideas, new crops, new technologies and new social institutions. The plough, harrows, wagons, square houses, Christianity, schooling, the production of wool, wheat, barley, tobacco and the infinite variety of vegetables all spread at an astonishing pace, particularly from the early 1870’s.”

 Superiority

Numerous contemporary accounts commented on the superiority of Black over White agriculturalists in this period, both in quantity and the quality of exhibits at agricultural shows. Black peasant farmers regularly outshone their White neighbours, and many White land owners found it more profitable – and less strenuous – to lease out their farms to Black peasant producers rather than cultivate them themselves. Black society in the Eastern Cape in this period did, nevertheless, not present a uniformly rosy and prosperous picture. An equally important part of the argument is that pari passu with peasantisation for one section of Black society came land shortages, poverty, and a growing dependence on wage labour for others. Moreover, the production of the population falling on hard times steadily grew, notably as a result of land annexation and booty raiding in the last frontier wars (1877 – 1881) and the crippling droughts which occurred
shortly before. An increasing differentiation within African society could be discerned with a small
group of perhaps 2,000 commercial Black farmers, and a larger body of peasants producing for the
market, and a majority of marginalized labourers who were forced to work for wages on a regular
basis. So much for the rise of the African peasantry - from the early 1890’s Bundy argues, the
African peasantry entered a precipitous decline. The main agents for its downfall were the mining
industry’s appetite for labour, which quickly outstripped supply, and an employers’ offensive which
was mounted against African agricultural self – sufficiency through a battery of laws culminating in
the Natives Land Act of 1913.

➢ Subsidies, limitation and research

The commercialization of White farming was simultaneously forced through by a massive
programme of subsidies (tax relief, credit, transport and so on) siphoned off the gold mining
industry and distributed per head of the rural population, had been devoted to the relief of farmers
in South Africa, more than in any country of the world, wrote Smith (1908). Against this unusual
competition, the Black peasantry increasingly failed to hold its own. By 1914, crippled by these
disadvantages and battered by rinderpest and other natural diseases, it had succumbed (The present
government has the historical record to use in the empowerment of Black farmers in South Africa,
for purposes of its reengineering, reconstruction and transformation). Similarly, arguments have
also been advanced in the pre 1850 period. A more serious criticism of Bundy’s analysis is that it
does not show why particular groups or homesteads were able to succeed as peasants in this
economic and political environment, and why others failed. For Bundy, progress and innovation are
all too often the result of the individual household head’s personal initiative and energy.”

It is precisely this aspect of Bundy’s analysis which recommends itself so strongly to Leon Louw’s
‘South Africa, The Solution’ (Bonner, 1988) which singles out the “Mfengu as the Cape’s natural
entrepreneurs, and the example of what might have been in South Africa, the self – governing states
and the TBVC homelands, and presumably what might come.” Yet, as a number of other
agricultural histories have commented, success, either as a commercial farmer or as an ordinary
peasant was predicated on prior access to resources, notably, family and other labour, cattle and
land, pre – colonial, pre – conquest society was itself differentiated and stratified, and it was those
best positioned at that time who were most likely to succeed later. Even then, where the Mfengu fit
in this background is unclear, and their role, like so many aspects of South African history, still
awaits adequate research. In this context, perhaps the best tribute one can pay to Bundy’s ‘Rise and
Fall’ is that it has opened up a huge and neglected area of South African history and decisively
changed the scholarly agenda, especially in this dynamic period of transition and transformation
and particularly for the continuous restructuring of agriculture in the new democratic South Africa
Unfortunately, it did not impact upon the policy-makers and the government of Bophuthatswana and now upon democratic South Africa, in terms of understanding the history of the past and the positive inputs upon agriculture that an understanding of our own agricultural history could have made, in seeking agricultural models, in order to redress the imbalances created by apartheid and the Bophuthatswana regime, in this part of the country now defined as the North West Province, and perhaps the whole of South Africa. In short Bophuthatswana lost its opportunity in relationship to the peasantry and in relationship to sustained development for the orderly economic empowerment of the rural periphery and the achievement of the general welfare and public good. On the other hand, democratic South Africa has also lost this opportunity in nearly 20 years of freedom. In other words, Bundy’s work has chartered a course for the case of African agriculture and, in a major way, has exposed the myth of agriculture in the South African dynamic, being viewed as a White preserve.

WHY OUR FARMERS DO SO BADLY?

The question leading directly from the discussion and analysis undertaken above is posed in terms of the huge gap between Zimbabwean and South African production, under optimum conditions prevailing for both countries. It is also posed from the aspect of exposing the myth that led to the belief by the apartheid South African regime, and the former Mangope government that while agricultural entrepreneurship in South African and Batswana agriculture was best. “South Africa’s natural cattle herd numbers about 9 million head, and the annual beef output is not enough to meet the needs of the country’s population of about 40 million, and thus meat had to be imported” (Annual Report, Meat Board 1990: 15 – 19). “It was also shown by researcher Veenstra that Bophuthatswana was also a net importer of meat and meat products, in spite of a cattle herd of over half a million” (Veenstra, 1987:6). “Zimbabwe’s national herd numbers 1, 5 million head, which, in spite of periodic temporary shortages, not only supplies the needs of the 8, 5 million people, but also produces 10, 000 tons of beef a year for export to Europe and earns an average of R75 million a year in foreign exchange” (Nicholas, 1991:9). (Note: Zimbabwe at independence and beyond, not today because of political turmoil and President Mugabe’s policies).

Zimbabwean farmers make representation to government calmly and through organized agriculture, and accepted other viewpoints or limitations. They are outstanding farmers, clear-thinking business people, willing to take normal risks. They will not hesitate to discard a doubtful line in favour of one that is more lucrative, they think positively. Unfortunately, this cannot be said for White South African farmers, because so many of them run a ‘hit or miss’ business, year after year. They are incapable of changing to other lines of limited, but certain, profitability; their management is far below standard. They make threats and organize crisis protests of other population groups and other sectors of the economy and continue to run to the state in order to bail them out. Similarly, they survived within agriculture because they own the large tracts of land to the exclusion of Black
farmers, received massive subsidies from the apartheid regime until the demise of apartheid, and that these subsidies and their debts were cancelled or wiped out prior to the negotiated political settlement in South Africa (Nicholas, 1991:9). If one had to consider the production of agriculture in former Bophuthatswana, and compare it to both these scenarios, it would be too ghastly to contemplate, for both commercial and subsistence agriculture.

There were about 4,000 White farmers in Zimbabwe compared to about 60,000 in South Africa. This relatively small number of Zimbabwean farmers boasted many diplomas and degrees among them and produced some 80 percent of the country’s total marketed agricultural output. (Note: Given Mugabe’s policies, White farmers have declined drastically due to the new land policy and expulsion of White farmers). Their exports brought in, on average, more than a billion rands in foreign exchange which was an indication of the high international recognition of their products. With more than 75 percent of the country subject to conditions that make dry land cropping a risky undertaking, (similar to Bophuthatswana) their achievements were outstanding. Similarly, subsistence farmers were highly motivated by a competent extension service and, considering their large numbers compared favourably with commercial farmers (Nicholas, 1991:9).

There is no reason why South African farmers and farms in the former homeland regions should have not striven to reach the same heights as their Zimbabwean counterparts. (Note: in the earlier years of Zimbabwean independence). Not only experience, but particularly knowledge, ability, a coordinated and workable extension programme in order to make the correct decisions, were needed to overcome the major challenge of steeped-up production. In addition, the legitimization of the Bophuthatswana regime was urgently required in order to gain the support of all the people and thereby to attain the badly required credibility. In the absence of this legitimacy, agriculture faced tremendous problems, especially in restructuring and the process of democratic access.

THE PRIMACY OF INDUSTALIZATION

Expanding the discussion in terms of the imperatives for newly – emerging ‘developing’ countries to industrialize was, and still is, underpinned by a set of factors, and in this regard former Bophuthatswana relentlessly pursued this objective as a primary policy imperative. First, the era of colonialism under the policy of apartheid was one of mass deprivation, and under the so-called dispensation called Bophuthatswana, the lot of the predominantly rural population was not significantly altered. On the contrary, it had steadily deteriorated in many ways. The fulfillment of the basic needs of the population required a certain level of industrial capability, and this is what Bophuthatswana, very ambitiously, embarked upon. The provision of health, education, housing and sanitation facilities was well nigh impossible in the absence of sustained monetary aid from the Republic of South Africa and, therefore, virtually impossible without the industrial sector.
However, it was not argued that so-called independence was a utopian ideal thrust upon the Batswana by the designs of apartheid. Secondly, small-scale modernization was deemed part of the pattern of early so-called development necessitated by another unwanted colonial legacy of dependency, misguided nation-building and so-called national defense requirements, which demanded a minimum level of industrialization. Thirdly, if modern economic growth was to be secured and a high growth of per capita income was to be achieved in the face of high growth rates of population, a process of structural change was necessary within the then Bophuthatswana, which would have rapidly increased the relative share of the high productivity industrial sector. Fourth, even where agricultural development was given high priority, it was recognized that this would call for the injection of modern inputs and infrastructural development which, in turn, required a prior development of basic industrial capacities. Lastly, particularly at a misguided ideological level, the process of industrialization was viewed by the regime, with much justification, as forming the backbone of projected economic independence in the so-called new era, whereby the myth of traditional economic relationships between the colonial master of the imperial country (South Africa) and the colony would be broken. In the case of Bophuthatswana, import-substituting industrialization across the broadest front was virtually non-negotiable. In the case of democratic South Africa, it has taken almost 20 years to engineer an industrial policy and cannot be compared with the former Bophuthatswana because, it has modern infrastructure, basic industrial capacities, a mature economy, is both an importer and exporter of commodities and goods, but above all is a recognized democratic government. However, the industrial policy of democratic South Africa has not been implemented judiciously and has not contributed to development in general or for that matter has not been able to deal decisively with the issues of unemployment, poverty and inequality. This is an indictment to the government of the Republic of South Africa. A clear paradigm shift in respect of the industrialization policy is required and should be taken into consideration by the democratic government, as soon as possible to grow the economy, break the spiral of dependency on certain imports and in order to deal with the issues of poverty, inequality and unemployment.

CONCLUSION

This historical overview alluded to and, captured some of the factors that contributed to the process of uneven development, within Bophuthatswana and, acknowledges that not all the issues relating to this important topic could be discussed. The paper, however captured adequately the six issues raised in the summary of this paper, and to this end the brief of the paper was accomplished. An attempt was made to discuss the dynamics of uneven development and underdevelopment in Bophuthatswana. In respect to the factors that contributed to low levels of living and low productivity generally within, the economy and within the agricultural sector in particular, are self-reinforcing social and economic phenomena in ‘developing’ countries. It is hoped that the democratic South African government will learn from the lessons and experiences of the former
Bophuthatswana, and engineer agricultural policies that will serve the people of South Africa, especially the poor and historically marginalized, in order to create a better life for all.

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